New DNI on the Al Qaeda Threat

Addendum to yesterday's speculation about a looming "Al Qaeda" attack.

The new director of national intelligence told members of Congress on Tuesday that senior leaders of Al Qaeda were steadily rebuilding the network’s bases inside Pakistan and that future attacks against the United States could be planned from Pakistan’s remote western mountains.

In his first testimony since taking office last month, Mike McConnell said Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri, were supervising the establishment of Qaeda camps in Pakistan similar to those that existed in Afghanistan before the Sept. 11 attacks, although he said the camps were not as fully developed as the former Afghan bases.

Mr. McConnell's appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee followed a succession of meetings between top American officials and Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, who officials in Washington have said was not doing enough to root out Islamist militants in Pakistan's tribal areas.

"It's something we’re very worried about and very concerned about," Mr. McConnell said.

Intelligence and counterterrorism officials, speaking anonymously, have spoken in the past several weeks about the new camps in Pakistan and the gradual rebuilding of Al Qaeda's command and control apparatus, but Mr. McConnell is the most senior official in Washington to describe in public what he called a growing problem.

And then there is this:

Vice President Dick Cheney, thinly veiled as a "senior administration official," told reporters on his plane on Tuesday that it was not correct that he "went in to beat up on" the Pakistani president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, for failing to confront Al Qaeda and the Taliban.

"That's not the way I work," said Mr. Cheney, violating the first rule of conducting a background interview: never refer to yourself in the first person, when it makes it obvious who is talking. "The idea that I'd go in and threaten someone is an invalid misreading of the way I do business."

Ho ho ho.

Was Cheney-Musharraf Meeting For Political Cover?

Someone who is well-versed in 9/11 skullduggery speculates that "chatter" about an impending "Al Qaeda" attack may be the motivator for Cheney's high-profile mission to meet Musharraf. The administration could later claim that they were doing all that was possible beforehand.

Here is the mainstream account of yesterday's Cheney-Musharraf meeting.

Vice President Dick Cheney's unannounced visit to this capital Monday was the latest and most visible sign of renewed American pressure on President Pervez Musharraf to crack down on Islamic militants in Pakistan's lawless tribal areas bordering Afghanistan.

But complex domestic considerations in Pakistan, and a keen awareness on Musharraf's part that the Bush administration sees no palatable alternative to his leadership, diminish the prospect of any dramatic Pakistani move against the militants, diplomats and analysts said.

"There is only so far that he is prepared to go," said Rahul Roy-Chaudhury of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a leading British think tank on security matters. "Some of this is dictated by the [Pakistani] military's view of things, and some by the fact that this is not politically popular in large parts of Pakistan."

Cheney became the latest high-ranking U.S. official to press Musharraf to rein in what American officials characterize as a volatile mix of homegrown militant groups, Taliban strategists and Al Qaeda elements, all operating with increasing freedom in the tribal zones along the Afghan-Pakistani border. ...

Neither Cheney nor Musharraf spoke publicly before or after their meeting at the presidential palace, which lasted more than two hours. They appeared before cameras for a handshake only.

In a written statement, however, the Pakistani leader's office acknowledged that Musharraf had come under at least indirect criticism. Cheney "expressed U.S. apprehensions of [the] regrouping of Al Qaeda in the tribal areas and called for concerted efforts in countering the threat," the statement said.

Cheney was accompanied by Stephen Kappes, the deputy CIA director, whose presence underscored U.S. concern over intelligence assessments that indicate a deteriorating situation in the tribal areas.

New Piece By Seymour Hersh On Iran War Plans

From Seymour Hersh's new piece on plans for the Iran war:

The Administration is now examining a wave of new intelligence on Iran's weapons programs. Current and former American officials told me that the intelligence, which came from Israeli agents operating in Iran, includes a claim that Iran has developed a three-stage solid-fueled intercontinental missile capable of delivering several small warheads—each with limited accuracy—inside Europe. The validity of this human intelligence is still being debated. ...

(Yesterday's launch of Iran's "space rocket" will give a boost to one side of the "debate.")

Still, the Pentagon is continuing intensive planning for a possible bombing attack on Iran, a process that began last year, at the direction of the President. In recent months, the former intelligence official told me, a special planning group has been established in the offices of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, charged with creating a contingency bombing plan for Iran that can be implemented, upon orders from the President, within twenty-four hours.

In the past month, I was told by an Air Force adviser on targeting and the Pentagon consultant on terrorism, the Iran planning group has been handed a new assignment: to identify targets in Iran that may be involved in supplying or aiding militants in Iraq. Previously, the focus had been on the destruction of Iran’s nuclear facilities and possible regime change.

Two carrier strike groups—the Eisenhower and the Stennis—are now in the Arabian Sea. One plan is for them to be relieved early in the spring, but there is worry within the military that they may be ordered to stay in the area after the new carriers arrive, according to several sources. (Among other concerns, war games have shown that the carriers could be vulnerable to swarming tactics involving large numbers of small boats, a technique that the Iranians have practiced in the past; carriers have limited maneuverability in the narrow Strait of Hormuz, off Iran’s southern coast.) The former senior intelligence official said that the current contingency plans allow for an attack order this spring. He added, however, that senior officers on the Joint Chiefs were counting on the White House's not being "foolish enough to do this in the face of Iraq, and the problems it would give the Republicans in 2008."

Management, Integration, and Oversight of Intelligence Community Analysis

In one of his last moves as director of national intelligence before leaving for the State Department, John D. Negroponte signed off on a new and unusually detailed policy directive that sets out common principles for intelligence analysis for the nation's 16 spy agencies.

The document lays out publicly for the first time a description of what is contained in the intelligence report given to President Bush each morning, known as the president's daily briefing. The often-30-page notebook may include "assessments of emerging problems or enduring challenges, results of long-term research, NIC [National Intelligence Council] estimates, crisis developments and analysis, open source reporting as well as occasional analysis that challenges conventional wisdom on critical issues." ...

It was disclosed on the Web site of Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists' secrecy project.

The whole document can be found here:

Management, Integration, and Oversight of Intelligence Community Analysis (8 page pdf)

NY Concerned About Iranian Terrorism

The allegations of Iranian wrongdoing continue...

Increasing tensions between Washington and Tehran have revived New York Police Department concerns that Iranian agents may already have targeted the city for terror attacks. Such attacks could be aimed at bridges and tunnels, Jewish organizations and Wall Street, NYPD briefers told security execs last fall, according to a person with access to the briefing materials who asked for anonymity because of the sensitive subject matter.

NYPD officials have worried about possible Iranian-sponsored attacks since a series of incidents involving officials of the Iranian Mission to the United Nations. In November 2003, Ahmad Safari and Alireaza Safi, described as Iranian Mission "security" personnel, were detained by transit cops when they were seen videotaping subway tracks from Queens to Manhattan at 1:10 in the morning. The men later left New York. "We're concerned that Iranian agents were engaged in reconnaissance that might be used in an attack against New York City at some future date," Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly told NEWSWEEK. A spokesman for the Iranian Mission in New York said he was aware of the allegations but had no immediate comment.

Israel Said To Be Negotiating For Permission To Overfly Iraq To Attack Iran

Israeli defence officials are understandably coy about revealing precisely how far advanced their plans are for launching air strikes against Iran in light of the current diplomatic offensive at the United Nations to halt Teheran's enrichment programme ending in failure.

But that the Israeli Air Force, as The Daily Telegraph exclusively discloses today, is negotiating with US coalition commanders in Iraq for permission to fly through US-controlled air space suggests Israeli military planners have overcome most of the key technical hurdles, such as in-flight refuelling and target selection.

"One of the last issues we have to sort out is how we actually get to targets in Iran," an Israeli officer involved in the military planning told me. "The only way to do this is to fly through US-controlled air space in Iraq. If we don't sort these issues out now we could have a situation where American and Israeli war planes are shooting at each other."

The pace of military planning in Israel, which has markedly accelerated since the start of the year, is being driven by Mossad's stark intelligence assessment that Iran, given the rate of progress on uranium enrichment at Natanz, could have enough fissile material for a nuclear warhead by 2009.

This is, it should be stressed, only an assessment as opposed to hard fact, and the Israeli assessment is starkly at odds with those made by other Western intelligence agencies, and by the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN-sponsored body responsible for monitoring nuclear development activities worldwide.

Italy In Political Turmoil Over Support Of U.S.

The resignation of Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi underscores the difficulty in Europe of governments trying to support US foreign policy on terror while at the same time pleasing their own publics.

Mr. Prodi, who has been in office less than a year, stepped down Wednesday after he was unable to convince his parliament of the "profound difference" between sending Italian troops to Afghanistan and sending them to Iraq. Italy currently deploys 1,950 troops in Afghanistan as part of a NATO mission of some 30,000 soldiers from European states.

The Prodi drama came hours after Britain and Denmark announced the start of troop withdrawals from Iraq – a blow to the White House as it deploys an additional 21,000 soldiers to stabilize Baghdad. In a further departure from perfect alignment with US policy in the Middle East, British prime minister Tony Blair also said this week that he will consider dealing with the Palestinian group Hamas as part of a new "national unity" government in the occupied territories.

European capitals are wavering over how to deal with a US administration in its final two years, one saddled with multiple inconclusive wars and battles against terror. ...

The center-left Prodi government in Rome was always fragile, a nine-party coalition whose main agreement was its dislike of the previous center-right government of Silvio Berlusconi. Prodi decided to resign, it appears, after he was unable to achieve supporting votes from within his coalition for Italy's troops in Afghanistan or to follow through on a two-year-old deal with Washington to expand a military base in Vicenza.

Still, growing negative perceptions in Italy over the US enterprise in the Middle East has been eroding many distinctions in the public mind between the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, according to French analyst Bernard Getta. Such perceptions deepened last week when a judge ordered that 25 suspected CIA operatives stand trial in Milan for kidnapping an Islamist cleric in 2003 and sending him to Egypt. On Feb. 18, tens of thousands of Italians marched in Vicenza.

Validating The "Al Qaeda Strategy"

One of the leading recruiters for Al Qaeda speaks out on the Democrats' efforts to place restrictions on the administration's conduct of the war.

QUESTION: Because Congressman Murtha and Speaker Pelosi have made it clear that what they would like to do is they would like to stop the surge. Can they do it? Do they have the power to stop the surge?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: I don't think so. The question is whether or not they have the votes. Jack Murtha is an old friend of mine. We've done a lot of business together over the years. When I was Secretary of Defense, he was perhaps my closest ally on Capitol Hill. Jack clearly has a different perspective. With respect to Iraq, I think he's dead wrong. I think, in fact, if we were to do what Speaker Pelosi and Congressman Murtha are suggesting, all we'll do is validate the al Qaeda strategy. The al Qaeda strategy is to break the will of the American people -- in fact, knowing they can't win in a stand-up fight, try to persuade us to throw in the towel and come home, and then they win because we quit.

Hadley Sent To Moscow To Try To Mend Fences

At a time when the "Axis of Evil" occupies most of the time and attention of the U.S. national security bureaucracy, our relationship with the "Evil Empire" can use some hands-on care.

President's Bush's national security adviser is embarking on a high-level mission to Moscow and other European capitals, just over a week after incendiary remarks about Bush and the United States by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Stephen Hadley was departing Washington Tuesday for a four-day trip to Brussels, Moscow and Berlin, said Gordon Johndroe, spokesman for Hadley and Bush's National Security Council.

In Brussels, Hadley planned to meet with NATO and European Union officials. In Moscow and Berlin, he was scheduled to sit down with his counterparts in the Russian and German governments.

"This is part of ongoing discussions that will cover a full range of issues," Johndroe said.

The planned U.S. ABM system to be located in Poland and the Czech Republic -- the proximate cause for Putin's outburst in Munich -- will be on the agenda.

An increasingly angry dispute over U.S. plans to deploy a missile defense system in Central Europe is adding strain to already fragile U.S.-Russian relations.

Under the proposal, the United States would build silos in Poland to hold 10 interceptor rockets that could destroy intercontinental ballistic missiles fired at the United States or even command sites in Europe. The accompanying radar system would be located in the Czech Republic.

U.S. officials say the system is not directed against Russia, but at the potential threat posed by missiles being developed by Iran.

That argument has been dismissed in Russia as spurious. ...

"If the governments of Poland and the Czech Republic take such a step, the strategic missile forces will be capable of targeting these facilities if a relevant decision is made," Gen. Nikolai Solovtsov, commander of Russian missile forces, said at a news conference Monday. ...

Irina Kobrinskaya, an analyst at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations in Moscow, said the Russian military might have grudgingly accepted the system if it were deployed on NATO's southern rim in Turkey, Romania or Bulgaria. But its placement to the north -- in the Czech Republic and Poland, which shares a land border with the Russian region of Kaliningrad -- has raised deep suspicion here.

"Elements of this new system can present a threat to Russia and that's the logic of the military," Kobrinskaya said in an interview.

For Russians, the system is part of a deeper pattern of what they see as U.S. encirclement, particularly through the continuing expansion of NATO.

Demographics of Iraq War Dead

Across the nation, small towns are quietly bearing a disproportionate burden of war. Nearly half of the more than 3,100 U.S. military casualties [sic] in Iraq have come from towns ... where fewer than 25,000 people live, according to an analysis by The Associated Press. One in five hailed from hometowns of less than 5,000.

Many of the hometowns of the war dead aren't just small, they're poor. The AP analysis found that nearly three quarters of those killed in Iraq came from towns where the per capita income was below the national average. More than half came from towns where the percentage of people living in poverty topped the national average. ...

On a per capita basis, states with mostly rural populations have suffered the highest casualties in Iraq. Vermont, South Dakota, Alaska, North Dakota, Nebraska, Wyoming, Delaware, Montana, Louisiana and Oregon top the list, the AP found.

Military Personnel To Fill State Dept Positions in Iraq

The Pentagon and State Department have worked out a deal to send a small number of military personnel and Defense Department civilians to Iraq for several months until Foreign Service officers and State Department contract workers with specialized skills can fill those jobs, senior officials said Monday.

The internal administration discussions over filling the posts had exposed tensions between the military and civilian agencies over how to share responsibilities in carrying out President Bush’s new strategy for stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq — in particular, how to fill hazardous positions in new provincial reconstruction teams.

The State Department had asked the Pentagon to come up with military personnel or civilians to fill about one-third of the 350 new State Department jobs in Iraq. While the numbers involved are relatively small, the debate raised larger issues of whether the government was properly organized to carry out a long-term occupation of a country like Iraq.

The State Department’s written request for military personnel to fill some of the positions temporarily, received in late January, was met with frustration by a number of senior Pentagon officials and military officers.

But last week, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates agreed to the State Department request. About 120 military personnel or Pentagon civilians will fill the jobs for up to four months, according to three senior officials who were briefed on the discussions.

The officials said the stopgap measure would give the State Department time to identify Foreign Service officers to serve in political and economic development jobs in Iraq and to use new Congressional financing to hire people with technical skills that are not routinely part of diplomatic missions overseas.

The officials said the jobs included industrial development specialists, public health advisers, engineers, veterinarians, agricultural experts and lawyers who specialize in creating or enhancing judicial institutions.

While those skills are not a standard part of the diplomatic corps, they are found among active duty military and reserve personnel. It is those people who will be asked to step in temporarily.

Cheney To Snub Japanese Defense Minister in Tokyo

Japanese Defense Minister Fumio Kyuma suggested last month that the war in Iraq was a mistake. He was criticized roundly by (hawkish Japanese prime minister Shinzo) Abe's people. Now, apparently as a punishment, the Bush administration asked Japan not to schedule a meeting between Cheney and Kyuma during this week's visit.

Thus, Cheney will snub the defense chief, the very person he would be expected to talk to in a visit focusing on defense and security issues. The message seems to be: Friends don't criticize friends. Japan, historically the bully of Asia, instinctively understands such threatening behavior.

There was no rational reason for Japan to get entangled in Iraq, and there's even less reason to become involved in Iran. However, Cheney appears bent on whipping up support for a reluctant Japan to continue to follow the Bush administration's lead in the war-torn Mideast. In refusing to meet with the defense minister, Cheney seems to be saying, in effect, that a silent nod to the wise is sufficient.

Prince Bandar Still Wheeling and Dealing

Longtime Saudi ambassador to the U.S. -- the skullduggerous Prince Bandar, who returned to the Kingdom to become their national security advisor -- continues to pursue his vocation as behind-the-scenes international power broker.

In the past month Bandar has held three meetings with the Iranian national security chief, Ali Larijani, most recently last Wednesday in Riyadh. He's met twice with Vladimir Putin, in Moscow and Riyadh, to talk about Middle East affairs; overseen talks between Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas leaders; and quietly shuttled to Washington to brief President Bush. He helped broker this month's Palestinian accord on a unity government as well as a Saudi-Iranian understanding to cool political conflict in Lebanon. And he's been talking with the most senior officials of the Iranian and U.S. governments about whether there's a way out of the standoff over Iran's nuclear weapons. ...

In his last visit to Washington he offered a rosy report on his travels. Iran, he assured his American friends, had been taken aback by President Bush's recent shows of strength in the region, by the failure of his administration to collapse after midterm elections and by the unanimous passage of a U.N. resolution imposing sanctions on Tehran for failing to stop its nuclear program. The mullahs, he said, were worried about Shiite-Sunni conflict spreading from Iraq around the region, and about an escalating conflict with the United States; they were interested in tamping both down.

Bandar and Larijani already worked to stop incipient street fighting between Lebanon's Shiite Hezbollah movement and pro-Western Sunni and Christian parties several weeks ago. But the Saudis have bigger plans: Bandar reported to Washington that he's hoping to split Iran from Syria ... The means would be a deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran over a Lebanese settlement that included authorization of a U.N. tribunal to try those responsible for the murder of former prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri. That would be poison to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who almost certainly was behind the murder.

Bandar's spin and dazzle make it tempting to think he can pull off almost anything. It's also easy to forget that he works in the interests of Saudi Arabia, not the United States.

Cuba and Venezuela Going To Open-Source Operating Systems

Cuba's communist government is trying to shake off the yoke of at least one capitalist empire -- Microsoft Corp. -- by joining with socialist Venezuela in converting its computers to open-source software.

Both governments say they are trying to wean state agencies from Microsoft's proprietary Windows to the open-source Linux operating system, which is developed by a global community of programmers who freely share their code.

"It's basically a problem of technological sovereignty, a problem of ideology," said Hector Rodriguez, who oversees a Cuban university department of 1,000 students dedicated to developing open-source programs. ...

Cuban officials, ever focused on U.S. threats, also see it as a matter of national security.

Communications Minister Ramiro Valdes, an old comrade-in-arms of President Fidel Castro, raised suspicions about Microsoft's cooperation with U.S. military and intelligence agencies as he opened a technology conference this week.

He called the world's information systems a "battlefield" where Cuba is fighting against imperialism.

He also noted that Microsoft Chairman Bill Gates once described copyright reformers -- including people who want to do away with proprietary software -- as "some new modern-day sort of communists" -- which is a badge of honor from the Cuban perspective. ...

Cuba's Cabinet also has urged a shift from proprietary software. The customs service has gone to Linux and the ministries of culture, higher education and communications are planning to do so, Rodriguez said.

And students in his own department are cooking up a version of Linux called Nova, based on Gentoo distribution of the operating system. The ministry of higher education is developing its own.

Rodriguez's department accounts for 1,000 of the 10,000 students within the University of Information Sciences, a five-year-old school that tries to combine software development with education.

Rice Questioned About Supplemental Funding Requests

The really interesting bit here are the items in the other funding requests mentioned in the last paragraph of this excerpt.

Skeptical lawmakers yesterday demanded a detailed accounting of how Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice plans to spend $6 billion in supplemental funds that the administration has asked for the State Department this year, much of it for Iraq and Afghanistan.

"I think you've got a lot of explaining to do," Rep. David R. Obey (D-Wis.) told Rice at a hearing of the House Appropriations subcommittee on state and foreign operations. "A huge majority of the funds in the supplemental are for military, not political or economic or reconstructive, purposes."

Both Republicans and Democrats asked pointed questions about the rising cost of efforts that seem to be failing, despite newly announced U.S. strategies for both countries. Even as the administration has asked for more money, Rep. Frank R. Wolf (R-Va.) told Rice, it ought to increase its diplomatic engagement with Iraq's neighbors in the Middle East.

"I plead with you, I beg of you," Wolf said, "if we're going to ask a young man or woman in our military to go to Iraq three different times, it's not asking too much . . . to send somebody to engage with regard to the Syrians." ...

Panel members sharply questioned both the supplemental budget and the other funding requests, including a planned $250 million cash payment to the government of Lebanon, $86 million requested for security assistance for Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, and more than $500 million being spent for a new U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.

U.S. Readies Guantánamo To Handle Possible Cuban Refugee Flood Following Death of Castro

Concerned about a possible mass exodus of Cubans, the Department of Defense plans to spend $18 million to prepare part of the U.S. Navy base at Guantánamo Bay to shelter interdicted migrants, U.S. officials told The Miami Herald.

The new installation is needed because terrorism suspects occupy space on the base used in past emergencies to hold large numbers of migrants, Bush administration officials directly involved said. They note that the facilities are designed to house people from any Caribbean nation who attempt to enter illegally -- not just Cubans.

But they say privately that Fidel Castro's illness and temporary hand-over of power to his brother Raúl last summer injected a renewed sense of urgency into plans to handle a mass exodus. The administration quietly requested the funds about a month ago and Congress has approved it, The Miami Herald was told.

The officials, who were authorized to speak on the subject but requested anonymity because of the sensitive nature of Cuban issues, say there is no sign a Cuban migration crisis is brewing, but they acknowledge predicting one is difficult. The 1980 Mariel boatlift, which saw 125,000 Cubans arrive in Florida, began when a group of Cubans tried to storm the Peruvian embassy in Havana.

The $18 million initiative is part of a broader U.S. government effort to prepare for the death of Castro. The administration will not say how many migrants it believes might flee Cuba or even if any will do so, but one expert warned that up to 500,000 may try to leave the island after Castro's death.

Top Bush Cabinet officials have met at least twice since December to review Cuba contingency plans.

A Glimpse of American Dominion

"Money trumps peace, sometimes. In other words, commercial interests are very powerful interests throughout the world." --President Bush, from yesterday's press conference.

National Defense University is Spared Incompetence of Feith

Gen. Tommy Franks has colorfully described Douglas Feith as "the dumbest bastard, the dumbest motherfucker on the face of the earth." Others would agree. He is now ensconced at Georgetown University, but he also was tapped last year for an academic position that would make a mockery of the military's "lessons learned" emphasis.

Last June, Douglas J. Feith, a former top Pentagon official involved in planning the Iraq war, was hired by a Defense Department graduate school for military officers and diplomats, with a four-year contract that was to pay him half a million dollars, Pentagon records show.

His duties as a "distinguished professor" at the National Defense University, a 30-year-old institution on the Washington waterfront financed by the Pentagon, included team-teaching a course and producing a report on ways to "organize the United States better for the long war on terrorism," according to the documents.

The hiring of Mr. Feith, whose role in helping to make the case for the Iraq invasion is still a matter of intense scrutiny a year and a half after he left the Pentagon, had never been announced.

And the job did not last long; the contract was terminated about a month later, records show. ...

David Thomas, a university spokesman, said the contract was canceled by "mutual decision" on Aug. 28 last year. That was three days after a reporter for The New York Times contacted Mr. Thomas with questions about the university’s ties to Mr. Feith. ...

The university has become a popular place with former Pentagon officials who served under former Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld. Gen. Richard B. Myers, who is retired from the Air Force and was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Mr. Rumsfeld, holds an endowed chair at the university. Former Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz and Mr. Feith have deposited copies of their official papers there, and Mr. Rumsfeld is considering doing the same, according to two Pentagon aides.

Some of Mr. Feith's former colleagues at the Pentagon said they were puzzled by the university’s decision to consider hiring him to lecture military officers on strategy for the fight against terrorism.

Thomas White, who was secretary of the Army during President Bush’s first term, said, "I find it bizarre that they would pick a guy whose performance has been generally maligned and ask him to teach the subject." He added that the decision to terminate the contract "shows somebody has some sense over there."

New Details On 2003 Effort By Iran To Negotiate With U.S.

A newly leaked document sheds some light on the Iranian outreach to the U.S. in the Spring of 2003 (see Who Sabotaged Iranian Outreach To U.S.?), in which an offer by Iran to negotiate over the most pressing issues between the two nations was summarily rejected by Washington.

The Swiss ambassador to Iran informed U.S. officials in 2003 that an Iranian proposal for comprehensive talks with the United States had been reviewed and approved by Iran's supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei; then-President Mohammad Khatami; and then-Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi, according to a copy of the cover letter to the Iranian document.

"I got the clear impression that there is a strong will of the regime to tackle the problem with the U.S. now and to try it with this initiative," Tim Guldimann, the ambassador, wrote in a cover letter that was faxed to the State Department on May 4, 2003. Guldimann attached a one-page Iranian document labeled "Roadmap" that listed U.S. and Iranian aims for potential negotiations, putting on the table such issues as an end to Iran's support for anti-Israeli militants, action against terrorist groups on Iranian soil and acceptance of Israel's right to exist.

The cover letter, which had not been previously disclosed, was provided by a source who felt its contents were mischaracterized by State Department officials.

The cover letter can be found here (2-page PDF).

Russia Bringing Coal To Newcastle

This sounds kind of sinister, if you catch my drift. The old "bringing coal to Newcastle" giveaway.

Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal said on Wednesday the kingdom does not see any obstacle to cooperating with Russia on developing a nuclear energy program.

"In fact there is no obstacle to cooperate with Russia on ... nuclear energy," Prince Saud told a news conference.

Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Monday during a visit to Saudi Arabia that his country would consider helping the kingdom with a possible atomic energy program.

"On nuclear energy, there was a (Russian) contact with the kingdom and the Gulf Cooperation Council," he said when asked if Saudi Arabia and Russia had made any agreements.

Saudi Arabia is the world's biggest oil exporter and a key ally of the United States.

Saudi Arabia and fellow GCC members Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, said in December they would study embarking on a joint civil atomic program.

The announcement by the GCC, a loose economic and political alliance, raised concern of a regional arms race with analysts saying the Arab bloc wanted to match Iran's nuclear program.

The United States suspects Iran's nuclear energy program aims to develop weapons, a charge Tehran denies.

How Would We Have Known That?

Did the Baghdad briefers screw the pooch on Sunday and reveal something that was obtained through national technical means?

Maybe that's why Gen. Pace is walking back the assertion.

Marine Gen. Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said yesterday that he has no information indicating Iran's government is directing the supply of lethal weapons to Shiite insurgent groups in Iraq.

"We know that the explosively formed projectiles are manufactured in Iran," Pace told Voice of America during a visit to Australia. "What I would not say is that the Iranian government, per se, knows about this."

"It is clear that Iranians are involved, and it's clear that materials from Iran are involved," he continued, "but I would not say by what I know that the Iranian government clearly knows or is complicit."

Pace's comments came a day after U.S. military officials in Baghdad alleged that the "highest levels" of the Iranian government have directed use of weapons that are killing U.S. troops in Iraq. No information was provided to substantiate the charge. Administration officials yesterday deflected requests for more details, even as they repeatedly implied Tehran's involvement. ...

Sunday's briefing on Iran, originally scheduled for last month, had been delayed as officials said they were trying to avoid "overstating" what they could prove.

Not Exactly a Consensus Judgment

Nobody thinks that Iran is not assisting the Shia in Iraq.

The important thing to consider is whether the level of Iranian help is really making any real difference in the situation. The Iraq NIE says no.

Which brings us to the real issue. Does Iran's actions vis á vis Iraq constitute a casus belli? (It doesn't.)

With so much official U.S. buildup about the purported evidence of Iranian influence in Iraq, the briefing was also notable for what was not said or shown. The officials offered no evidence to substantiate allegations that the "highest levels" of the Iranian government had sanctioned support for attacks against U.S. troops. Also, the military briefers were not joined by U.S. diplomats or representatives of the CIA or the office of the Director of National Intelligence.

The delay in getting around to presenting yesterday's previously announced briefing and the absence of representatives of the other Country Team components strongly indicates an institutional battle over the extent of the Iranian "meddling" (Orwellian U.S. usage) in Iraq.

White House To Accuse Iran of Harboring Al Qaeda

The Bush administration's attempts to prepare the American public for a possible attack upon Iran will soon involve allegations that Iran is harboring members of Al Qaeda.

One problem with this info-op, Iran has been capturing and holding high-value Al Qaeda operatives when they can, and have offered -- with no success -- to hand them over to the United States (in exchange for appropriate consideration, of course).

This has been widely reported for several years, but what makes it noteworthy now is the planned PR campaign to allege that Iran is in cahoots with America's deadly enemy.

Last week, the CIA sent an urgent report to President Bush's National Security Council: Iranian authorities had arrested two al-Qaeda operatives traveling through Iran on their way from Pakistan to Iraq. The suspects were caught along a well-worn, if little-noticed, route for militants determined to fight U.S. troops on Iraqi soil, according to a senior intelligence official.

The arrests were presented to Bush's senior policy advisers as evidence that Iran appears committed to stopping al-Qaeda foot traffic across its borders, the intelligence official said. That assessment comes at a time when the Bush administration, in an effort to push for further U.N. sanctions on the Islamic republic, is preparing to publicly accuse Tehran of cooperating with and harboring al-Qaeda suspects.

The strategy has sparked a growing debate within the administration and the intelligence community, according to U.S. intelligence and government officials. One faction is pressing for more economic embargoes against Iran, including asset freezes and travel bans for the country's top leaders. But several senior intelligence and counterterrorism officials worry that a public push regarding the al-Qaeda suspects held in Iran could jeopardize U.S. intelligence-gathering and prompt the Iranians to free some of the most wanted individuals. ...

U.S. officials have asserted for years that several dozen al-Qaeda fighters, including Osama bin Laden's son, slipped across the Afghan border into Iran as U.S. troops hunted for the perpetrators of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. U.S. and allied intelligence services, which have monitored the men's presence inside Iran, reported that Tehran was holding them under house arrest as bargaining chips for potential deals with Washington.

Last fall, Bush administration officials asked the CIA to compile a list of those suspects so the White House could publicize their presence. ...

Since al-Qaeda fighters began streaming into Iran from Afghanistan in the winter of 2001, Tehran had turned over hundreds of people to U.S. allies and provided U.S. intelligence with the names, photographs and fingerprints of those it held in custody, according to senior U.S. intelligence and administration officials. In early 2003, it offered to hand over the remaining high-value targets directly to the United States if Washington would turn over a group of exiled Iranian militants hiding in Iraq.

Some of Bush's top advisers pushed for the trade, arguing that taking custody of bin Laden's son and the others would produce new leads on al-Qaeda. They were also willing to trade away the exiles -- members of a group on the State Department's terrorist list -- who had aligned with Saddam Hussein in an effort to overthrow the Iranian government.

Officials have said Bush ultimately rejected the exchange on the advice of Vice President Cheney and then-Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, who argued that any engagement would legitimize Iran and other state sponsors of terrorism. Bush's National Security Council agreed to accept information from Iran on al-Qaeda but offer nothing in return, officials said.

Here is the framework in which the administration's propaganda program involving Iran/Al Qaeda links will be presented:

Bush administration officials pointed to U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1373, which state that harboring al-Qaeda members constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and authorize force to combat that threat. The resolutions compel nations to share any information on al-Qaeda suspects and give the United Nations authority to freeze the assets of suspects and those who provide them with safe haven.

Two U.S. officials said the administration plans to argue that Iran is violating those resolutions. A team of senior U.S. officials has been holding briefings for visiting European diplomats on the issue while administration lawyers prepare options for holding Iran in violation of U.N. resolutions.

All House Members Given Blanket Access To Full Iraq NIE

Members of congress have always had the ability -- upon request -- to read NIEs at one of the Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs) on Capitol Hill.

Perhaps not surprisingly, few ever take advantage of the opportunity.

This time, they do not need to request permission to view the document. I doubt if more than a handful of members who are not on the Intelligence Committee will bother.

To the surprise of the Bush administration, the House Intelligence Committee voted unanimously Wednesday night to allow all 435 House members to see the classified version of the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq sent to the White House last week. The report is classified in part because it contains information about sources and methods used in intelligence-gathering. ...

In announcing the vote to allow all members access to the classified portion of the NIE, the committee said those examining it "will be required to review the document in the Committee's secure offices in the Capitol and sign a secrecy oath." The members will not be allowed to leave with notes, congressional sources said.

The White House was not informed or consulted about the decision. Such access for members is rare but not unprecedented. The document had been made available to members of several committees with jurisdiction over the intelligence community, but other lawmakers would have needed to request permission to read it. The committee had received written requests from one Republican and one Democrat, plus some other informal inquires, and decided it would be better to allow blanket access instead of voting on each request, congressional sources said.

Who Sabotaged Iranian Outreach To U.S.?

Prevarication by Rice?

Or skullduggery by Elliott Abrams?

Its one of the two.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was pressed yesterday on whether the Bush administration missed an opportunity to improve relations with Iran in 2003, when Tehran issued a proposal calling for a broad dialogue with the United States, on matters including cooperation on nuclear safeguards, action against terrorists and possible recognition of Israel.

Although former administration officials have said the proposal was discussed and ultimately rejected by top U.S. officials, Rice, who was then national security adviser, said she never saw it.

"I have read about this so-called proposal from Iran," Rice told the House Foreign Affairs Committee yesterday, referring to reports in The Washington Post and other publications last year. "We had people who said, 'The Iranians want to talk to you,' lots of people who said, 'The Iranians want to talk to you.' But I think I would have noticed if the Iranians had said, 'We're ready to recognize Israel.' . . . I just don't remember ever seeing any such thing."

Rep. Robert Wexler (D-Fla.) cited a former Rice staff member, Flynt Leverett, who has publicly discussed seeing the proposal when he worked at the White House. ...

Rice's comments add a new level of complexity to an issue that has generated debate among foreign policy experts: Did the Bush administration forgo a chance to pursue a dialogue with Iran shortly after the fall of Baghdad, when U.S. power seemed at its height?

The Iranian document, conveyed to Washington via the Swiss Embassy, listed a series of Iranian aims for potential talks, such as ending sanctions, full access to peaceful nuclear technology and a recognition of its "legitimate security interests," according to a copy that has circulated in Washington and was verified by Iranian and U.S. officials.

In the document, Iran offered to put a series of U.S. aims on the agenda, including full cooperation on nuclear safeguards, "decisive action" against terrorists, coordination in Iraq, ending "material support" for Palestinian militias and accepting a two-state solution in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The document also laid out an agenda for negotiations, including possible steps to be achieved at a first meeting and the development of road maps on disarmament, countering terrorism and economic cooperation. ...

Leverett said yesterday that he became aware of the two-page offer, which came over a fax machine at the State Department, ... but that it was not his responsibility to put it on Rice's desk because Rice had placed Elliott Abrams in charge of Middle East policy. "If he did not put it on her desk, that says volumes about how she handled the issue," he said yesterday.

Abrams is currently the deputy national security adviser in charge of the Middle East and democracy promotion. An NSC spokeswoman, speaking on behalf of Abrams, said yesterday that Abrams "has no memory of any such fax and never saw or heard of any such thing." ...

Leverett said the Iranian offer is "embarrassing and politically difficult" for the administration now that it has rejected calls for a dialogue from the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, has confronted Iranian agents in Iraq and has expanded military assets in the Persian Gulf.

Leverett charged in December that the White House orchestrated an effort by the CIA to demand significant deletions in an opinion article he had written on Iran policy on the grounds that the material was classified. "The single biggest recision" concerned his description of the Iran's 2003 offer, he said yesterday.

Secret Anti-Sudan Program Begins

President Bush has approved a plan for the Treasury Department to aggressively block U.S. commercial bank transactions connected to the government of Sudan, including those involving oil revenues, if Khartoum continues to balk at efforts to bring peace to Sudan's troubled Darfur region, government officials said yesterday.

The Treasury plan is part of a secret three-tiered package of coercive steps -- labeled "Plan B" -- that the administration has repeatedly threatened to unleash if Sudan continues to sponsor a campaign of terror that has left as many as 450,000 dead and 2.5 million homeless. ...

Some aspects of Plan B have already been stealthily launched, such as stationing four U.S. Army colonels last month as observers on the Sudan-Chad border in full view of Sudanese intelligence. The unannounced move was intended as a signal to Khartoum, which the administration accuses of launching a "quiet war" against Chad's government to widen the Darfur conflict. ...

Sudan's economy is largely dollar-based, meaning many commercial transactions flow through the United States and making it especially vulnerable to Treasury actions. Indeed, U.S. intelligence, which has stepped up reporting on Sudan in recent months to prepare for a confrontation, believes Khartoum set up a government committee to explore ways of obtaining oil revenues that did not involve dollars, such as barter deals, one official said. Sudan's government has also unsuccessfully sought new oil contracts that would provide for large upfront payments. ...

Officials hope a ripple effect of Treasury's actions would extend to other countries and companies doing business with Sudan, forcing them to reconsider whether they want to be tainted or, more troubling, subjected to Treasury's scrutiny.

The EFP as an Info-Op Prop

Interesting info on the propaganda meme that Iran is supplying a certain type of nasty IED to Iraqi malefactors:

Significantly Odierno did not claim that the anti-armor roadside bombs known as explosively formed projectiles (EFPs), which represent the most lethal armor-piercing technology now being used in Iraq, were manufactured in Iran. Instead, he asserted that the technology itself and "some of the elements to make them are coming out of Iran."

That has been the refrain of the Bush administration and the U.S. command for nearly a year. The Deputy Chief of Staff for intelligence of the Multinational Forces in Iraq, Major General Richard Zahner, gave a press conference last September in which he argued that Iran's culpability in the appearance of EFP technology is proven by the fact that the C-4 explosive used in EFPs in Iraq has the same Iranian batch number as the C-4 found on the Hezbollah ship carrying arms to Palestinian militants that was intercepted by the Israelis in 2003.

Zahner's assertion is contradicted, however, by the most in-depth study of the subject so far -- an article by Michael Knights published in Jane's Intelligence Review late last month. Knights, vice-president and head of analysis for the Olive Group, a private security company based in London, has been following the evolution of EFPs in Iraq for nearly three years.

In the article and in an interview with me, Knights suggested that the evidence does not point to Iran as the primary force behind the use of EFPs in Iraq. "There is no need to see an Iranian policy driving it," he told me. Knights said it is far more likely that Hezbollah policy drove the phenomenon. He points out that it was Hezbollah, not Iran, that transferred EFP devices and components to Palestinian militants after the second Intifada began in 2000.

The remarkable coincidence of the same batch number of C-4 appearing in the intercepted Hezbollah ship and in southern Iraq indicates that the Shiite militias have been getting supplies not from the Iranians, but from Hezbollah. (If Iran had deliberately shipped the explosive to southern Iraq last year, the batch number would have been different from a batch that was given to Hezbollah years earlier.)

In the article, Knights suggests that the number of Hezbollah specialists helping Iraqi Shiites learn to use the technology "need not have exceeded one or two bomb-makers," since the numbers of EFPs produced has rarely exceeded 100 per month. That number, he concludes, could have been made in a single modest workshop with one or two technicians.

Knights acknowledges that there is no direct evidence of even such a minimal Hezbollah presence. He infers such a presence from the fact that the technology did not appear in crude experimental form in Shiite areas of southern Iraq during the Sadrist uprising in 2004, but rather as a complex, fully developed technology.

U.S. intelligence has made much of the fact that a Hezbollah manual for making EFPs has been captured in Iraq. Knights notes, however, that the manual was actually found in the hands of Sunni insurgents. Knights says the Sunnis "might also have access to EFP expertise through Palestinian groups." The Sunnis used EFPs on a number of occasions, but most often have relied on the less powerful "shaped charges" that they appear to make themselves.

Regardless of how the technology was initially picked up by Shiite militants, Knights points out that the trend since early 2005 has been toward the emergence of networks of Shiites who make the EFPs themselves, supply them to Shiite militias, and serve as middlemen in importing both devices and components. The network of middlemen, according to Knights, is not aligned with any particular Shiite group and is typified by the one discovered by British forces in Basra in December 2006. It consisted of members of the Basra Police Intelligence Unit, the Internal Affairs Directorate of the police, and the Major Crimes Unit and was drawn from policemen representing every major Shiite faction in Basra.

Knights' research on EFPs illustrates that the Bush administration campaign to blame Iran for the Shiite use of modern weapons is based not on intelligence but rather, once again, on its own faith-based worldview. The syllogism underlying the anti-Iran campaign is: Hezbollah has been helping Shiites. Hezbollah is an Iranian proxy. Therefore, Iran is arming the Shiites. As Knights cautiously put it in the interview, "It may be that they are taking a data point and blowing it out of proportion."

Petraeus Turns To Counterinsurgency Experts

Gen. David H. Petraeus, the new U.S. commander in Iraq, is assembling a small band of warrior-intellectuals -- including a quirky Australian anthropologist, a Princeton economist who is the son of a former U.S. attorney general and a military expert on the Vietnam War sharply critical of its top commanders -- in an eleventh-hour effort to reverse the downward trend in the Iraq war. ...

As the U.S.-designed campaign to bring security to Baghdad unfolds, Petraeus's chief economic adviser, Col. Michael J. Meese, will coordinate security and reconstruction efforts, trying to ensure that "build" follows the "clear" and "hold" phases of action. Meese also holds a PhD from Princeton, where he studied how the Army historically handled budget cuts. He is the son of former attorney general Edwin Meese III, who was a member of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, whose December critique helped push the Bush administration to shift its approach in Baghdad.

Petraeus, who along with the group's members declined to be interviewed for this article, has chosen as his chief adviser on counterinsurgency operations an outspoken officer in the Australian Army. Lt. Col. David Kilcullen holds a PhD in anthropology, for which he studied Islamic extremism in Indonesia.

Kilcullen has served in Cyprus, Papua New Guinea and East Timor and most recently was chief strategist for the State Department's counterterrorism office, lent by the Australian government. His 2006 essay "Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency" was read by Petraeus, who sent it rocketing around the Army via e-mail. Among Kilcullen's dictums: "Rank is nothing: talent is everything" -- a subversive thought in an organization as hierarchical as the U.S. military.

The two most influential members of the brain trust are likely to be Col. Peter R. Mansoor and Col. H.R. McMaster, whose influence already outstrips their rank. Both men served on a secret panel convened last fall by Gen. Peter Pace, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to review Iraq strategy. The panel's core conclusion, never released to the public but briefed to President Bush on Dec. 13, according to an officer on the Joint Staff, was that the U.S. government should "go long" in Iraq by shifting from a combat stance to a long-term training-and-advisory effort. ...

Mansoor, who commanded a brigade of the 1st Armored Division in Baghdad in 2003-04, received a PhD at Ohio State for a dissertation on how U.S. Army infantry divisions were developed during World War II. He will be Petraeus's executive officer in Baghdad, a key figure in implementing the general's decisions.

McMaster's command of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in northwestern Iraq in 2005-06 provided one of the few bright spots for the U.S. military in Iraq over that year. In a patiently executed campaign, he took back the city of Tall Afar from a terrorist group, and he was so successful that Bush dedicated much of a speech to the operation. McMaster, author of the well-received book "Dereliction of Duty," about the failures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Vietnam War, is expected to operate for Petraeus as a long-distance adviser on strategy. He is based this year at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London think tank, but is likely to visit Iraq every month or two, according to a top U.S. military officer.

Many military insiders are skeptical that the extra brainpower ultimately will make much difference, or that lessons learned by McMaster in Tall Afar or Petraeus in Mosul will be easily applied in the far larger arena of Baghdad.

The joke among some staff officers was that Petraeus operated in such a freewheeling manner in Iraq's north that he had his own foreign policy with Syria and Turkey. In Baghdad, by contrast, he will have to operate constantly with Iraqi officials, with the U.S. government bureaucracy, and in the global media spotlight. Also, experts agree that the basic problem in Iraq is political, not military, and that although a military campaign can create a breathing space for politicians, it cannot by itself reverse the dynamic driving Iraqis to fight a civil war.

Political and Economic Tracks of the New Iraq "Strategy"

Today, we take a look at the political and economic components of the ad hoc fuck-up that is otherwise referred to as President Bush's new Iraq "strategy."

As with the military track, success does not look to be a likely outcome of the policy tweaks.

Especially when we are backing the less-than-attractive Maliki regime.

The success of the Bush administration's new Iraq strategy depends on a series of rapid and dramatic political and economic reforms that even the plan's authors have little confidence will work. ...

Several senior officials involved in formulating the political and economic aspects of the administration's strategy, along with a number of informed outsiders, agreed to discuss its assumptions and risks on the condition that they not be identified by name. Other sources refused to be even anonymously quoted, describing the administration as standing on the brink of an intricate combination of maneuvers [ed. note: the ad hoc fuck-up] whose outcome is far from assured. ...

The strategy's political component centers on replacing deepening Sunni-Shiite-Kurdish divides with a new delineation between "extremists" and "moderates." Moderates are defined as those of all religious and political persuasions who eschew violence in favor of safety and employment.

With the help of outside Iraq experts, the administration has compiled lists of active and still-untapped moderates around the country. "They wondered could I give them some [names] from the provinces or anywhere" from which to construct a new political base, recalled one think-tank expert called to the State Department in December. According to the intelligence estimate, however, Iraq's reservoir of such people, especially trained technocrats and entrepreneurs, has been drained as they have fled the country in droves.

As American and Iraqi combat forces focus on cooling the cauldron of violence in Baghdad, U.S. military commanders and State Department teams plan to funnel "bridge money" toward moderate designees in outer provinces and in the capital to create jobs, start businesses and revitalize moribund factories. Iraqi money would come in behind to make it all permanent. ...

As they put the plan together, officials held heated internal debates over whether Maliki was the right man to head such an effort. Some argued in favor of engineering a new Iraqi government under Maliki's Shiite coalition partner, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, head of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), and Hakim's political stalking horse, Iraqi Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi.

They closely examined the makeup of Iraq's 275-seat parliament, where a no-confidence vote requires only a simple majority. Maliki's Dawa party is part of the Hakim-led United Iraqi Alliance, the largest Shiite group, with 130 seats. Making a strong case for SCIRI, some argued that the Iraqis themselves were so fed up with Maliki that a different governing coalition is possible with realigned Sunni and Kurdish elements. This view found proponents in the White House and Pentagon, and it extended into parts of the normally more cautious State Department. ...

Several officials said they believe that Hakim's backers in the Bush administration have been seduced by his forceful demeanor and Abdul Mahdi's fluent English. And while many emphasized the importance of a single, visible Iraqi leader, others have said it is a mistake to personalize the policy in one Shiite actor.

After extensive discussions last month with Maliki, Hakim and Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, the most senior Sunni in the Iraqi government, policymakers decided to place their bets on Maliki. ...

Many experts believe that the administration's effort to build a new political center, supported by "moderate" Sunni allies in the region that fear Shiite Iranian expansion, such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt, is hopelessly outdated. "Our struggle may be between moderates and extremists," Brookings Institution scholar Martin Indyk said last month. "Their struggle is between Sunnis and Shias."

On the economic front, where the United States has already invested more than $38 billion, the administration has asked for $538 million to keep current programs running and has proposed an additional $1.2 billion for new initiatives that it says will receive long-term Iraqi funding.

A combination of violent attacks on previous projects, sectarian favors, inefficient and overly cautious officials, and a complex bureaucracy -- much of it installed by the United States under the post-invasion Coalition Provisional Authority -- has left the Iraqi government with a significant capital surplus in each of the past several years.

Getting approval for reconstruction expenditures in the past, observed one U.S. official, has been like "pushing wet spaghetti." The surplus, which is kept in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, now totals $12.5 billion. Maliki has publicly agreed to spend $10 billion of it on reconstruction and jobs.

The State Department has sent new "tiger teams" to six Iraqi ministries to help clear away the wreckage of the past and speed financing for approved projects, and it plans to double to 20 the number of U.S.-staffed provisional reconstruction teams in Baghdad and around the country.

Key Judgments of Iraq NIE

The key judgments of the NIE on Iraq have been declassified and posted on the DNI website.

Some highlights:

Iraqi society’s growing polarization, the persistent weakness of the security forces and the state in general, and all sides’ ready recourse to violence are collectively driving an increase in communal and insurgent violence and political extremism. Unless efforts to reverse these conditions show measurable progress during the term of this Estimate, the coming 12 to 18 months, we assess that the overall security situation will continue to deteriorate at rates comparable to the latter part of 2006. If strengthened Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), more loyal to the government and supported by Coalition forces, are able to reduce levels of violence and establish more effective security for Iraq’s population, Iraqi leaders could have an opportunity to begin the process of political compromise necessary for longer term stability, political progress, and economic recovery.

• Nevertheless, even if violence is diminished, given the current winner-take-all attitude and sectarian animosities infecting the political scene, Iraqi leaders will be hard pressed to achieve sustained political reconciliation in the time frame of this Estimate.

...

• Despite real improvements, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)—particularly the Iraqi police—will be hard pressed in the next 12-18 months to execute significantly increased security responsibilities, and particularly to operate independently against Shia militias with success. Sectarian divisions erode the dependability of many units, many are hampered by personnel and equipment shortfalls, and a number of Iraqi units have refused to serve outside of the areas where they were recruited.

...

The Intelligence Community judges that the term “civil war” does not adequately capture the complexity of the conflict in Iraq, which includes extensive Shia-on-Shia violence, al-Qa’ida and Sunni insurgent attacks on Coalition forces, and widespread criminally motivated violence. Nonetheless, the term “civil war” accurately describes key elements of the Iraqi conflict, including the hardening of ethno-sectarian identities, a sea change in the character of the violence, ethno-sectarian mobilization, and population displacements.

Coalition capabilities, including force levels, resources, and operations, remain an essential stabilizing element in Iraq. If Coalition forces were withdrawn rapidly during the term of this Estimate, we judge that this almost certainly would lead to a significant increase in the scale and scope of sectarian conflict in Iraq, intensify Sunni resistance to the Iraqi Government, and have adverse consequences for national reconciliation.

• If such a rapid withdrawal were to take place, we judge that the ISF would be unlikely to survive as a non-sectarian national institution; neighboring countries—invited by Iraqi factions or unilaterally—might intervene openly in the conflict; massive civilian casualties and forced population displacement would be probable; AQI would attempt to use parts of the country—particularly al-Anbar province—to plan increased attacks in and outside of Iraq; and spiraling violence and political disarray in Iraq, along with Kurdish moves to control Kirkuk and strengthen autonomy, could prompt Turkey to launch a military incursion.

...

Iraq’s neighbors influence, and are influenced by, events within Iraq, but the involvement of these outside actors is not likely to be a major driver of violence or the prospects for stability because of the self-sustaining character of Iraq’s internal sectarian dynamics. Nonetheless, Iranian lethal support for select groups of Iraqi Shia militants clearly intensifies the conflict in Iraq. Syria continues to provide safehaven for expatriate Iraqi Bathists and to take less than adequate measures to stop the flow of foreign jihadists into Iraq.

Iraq NIE Delivered To White House

What's the matter with this picture?

A long-awaited National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, presented to President Bush by the intelligence community yesterday, outlines an increasingly perilous situation in which the United States has little control and there is a strong possibility of further deterioration, according to sources familiar with the document. ...

The document emphasizes that although al-Qaeda activities in Iraq remain a problem, they have been surpassed by Iraqi-on-Iraqi violence as the primary source of conflict and the most immediate threat to U.S. goals.

Say what? "Al Qaeda" activities in Iraq have never been the "primary source of conflict" or "the most immediate threat to U.S. goals." Nobody with any credibility has asserted this to be the case.

Until now.

The only way a statement of this type can be made is if we are lumping all Sunni insurgents -- including secular former Baathist regime elements -- under the rubric "Al Qaeda."

Or more likely, somebody is bullshitting the WaPo's not-usually credulous Karen DeYoung and Walter Pincus as to the key judgments of the NIE.


UPDATE: Having read the key judgments myself now, it is clear that DeYoung and Pincus bought a load of shit on the Al Qaeda claim from their source(s).

Former CIA Official Nears Indictment

Things are looking bad for a former top CIA administrative official, Kyle "Dusty" Foggo.

Federal prosecutors are preparing to seek indictments against a former top CIA official and a San Diego defense contractor linked to the bribery scandal that sent former U.S. Rep. Randy "Duke" Cunningham to prison, two government officials familiar with the investigation said Wednesday.

The officials, who spoke to The Associated Press only on condition of anonymity because grand jury proceedings are secret and the charges have not been finalized, said prosecutors plan to ask a San Diego grand jury to return charges of honest services fraud and conspiracy against Kyle "Dusty" Foggo and Brent Wilkes.

Wilkes' lawyers have said he is one of four unidentified co-conspirators described in the 2005 plea agreement for Cunningham, a San Diego Republican.

Honest services fraud is a combination of mail and wire fraud often used in public corruption cases involving officials who have engaged in a pattern of improper activities, such as accepting gifts, trips or promises of future employment from private individuals. ...

Foggo was the No. 3 official at the CIA, responsible for the agency's day-to-day operations, until resigning in May after his home and office were raided by FBI agents in connection with the Cunningham probe headed by the U.S. attorney's office in San Diego.

Federal law enforcement agencies and intelligence officials have been investigating whether Foggo improperly awarded contracts to Wilkes' companies, including a multimillion-dollar contract to supply bottled water for CIA operations in Iraq.

A House Intelligence Committee report on Cunningham's activities released last November said Foggo steered $70 million in contracts to Wade and Wilkes.

The House Intelligence, Appropriations and Armed Services committees were subpoenaed in December by prosecutors for documents relating to the Cunningham investigation. A House aide said Wednesday that House lawyers have asked for more time and are working to negotiate a response that satisfies prosecutors so they can withdraw the subpoenas.