U.N. Says Jury Still Out on Iran Nuclear Program

The United Nations nuclear watchdog agency gave an upbeat assessment of Iranian cooperation with international inspectors in a new report Thursday that could make it more difficult for the United States to win tougher U.N. sanctions against Iran.

The report by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna also concluded that while Iran continues to enrich uranium in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions, its fuel enrichment plant has produced "well below the expected quantity for a facility of this design." The quality of the uranium also was lower than expected, the IAEA said.

The report praised Iran for taking "a significant step forward" by agreeing to a new work plan and timelines for resolving numerous questions about the history of its nuclear program. Separately, U.N. officials said that Iran had slowed construction of a new plutonium-fuel reactor in Arak. ...

The report suggests that if Iran adheres to the program and timelines, the agency could resolve its remaining questions about the nature of the country's nuclear program by the end of the year and close the file.

"For the first time in a couple of years, we have been able to agree with the Iranians on a working arrangement, on how to resolve the outstanding issues," the U.N. agency's deputy director, Olli Heinonen, told reporters in Vienna. "What Iran is now facing is actually a litmus test" on whether it will deliver what it has promised, because its failure to do so in the past triggered Security Council action, Heinonen said.

If the IAEA concludes that Iran has not engaged in a covert program to develop nuclear weapons, it could raise new questions about the quality of U.S. intelligence in the Middle East. ...

Longtime observers of Iran's program were struck by the report's revelations of slow progress of uranium enrichment. Iran appears to be running well behind its own self-imposed schedule for building new centrifuge machines, and its existing machines are operating well below capacity.

Based on IAEA figures, Iran is producing low-enriched uranium at a rate of about 31 pounds a month, compared with an expected rate of nearly 200 pounds a month, according to an analysis by the Institute for Science and International Security, a Washington-based research group.

The low output suggests that Iran is either experiencing technical difficulties or has perhaps decided to slow production to "forestall negative reactions that would lend support for further sanctions," the institute said in a report released Thursday. Low-enriched uranium is used for making nuclear power and cannot be converted for weapons use unless it undergoes further processing. ...

The report "indicates that Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities, which is a violation of U.S. Security Council resolutions." Such a step is necessary "for the international community to gain confidence that Iran's nuclear activities are exclusively for peaceful purposes."

France said that it would continue pursuing sanctions as long as Iran continued enriching uranium, and a statement by the British Foreign Office said that it also lacked confidence in Iran's nuclear intentions. ...

The report cites several contentious issues that have been resolved recently through a renewed dialogue with Iran and the work program that Iranian and U.N. officials agreed to in a series of meetings in July and August.

"This is the first time Iran is ready to discuss all the outstanding issues which triggered the crisis in confidence," Mohamed ElBaradei, the I.A.E.A. director general, said in an interview. "It's a significant step."

But the Bush administration and its allies, which have won sanctions in the United Nations Security Council in an effort to stop Iran's uranium enrichment, saw the latest report as more evidence of defiance, not cooperation.

"There is no partial credit here," a State Department spokesman, Tom Casey, said Thursday. "Iran has refused to comply with its international obligations, and as a result of that the international community is going to continue to ratchet up the pressure." ...

Dr. ElBaradei suggested that he would welcome a delay in the American-led strategy to impose new sanctions, saying, "I'm clear at this stage you need to give Iran a chance to prove its stated goodwill. Sanctions alone, I know for sure, are not going to lead to a durable solution."

The agreement, announced Monday, laid out a timetable of cooperation with the goal of wrapping up by December nuclear issues that have been under investigation for four years. By then, Dr. ElBaradei said, the agency will know whether Iran was "serious" or "was trying to take us for a ride."

Draft GAO Report Says Iraq Government Not Meeting Expectations

The reason that the U.S. endeavor in Iraq was doomed to fail from the very beginning was that the goal -- to establish another U.S.-client state in the Middle East, and in a Shiite majority country at that -- was unrealistic in the extreme. We have been lowering our expectations and objectives as we go along.

An unvarnished appraisal of the current Iraqi government is being prepared by the GAO, and a pre-redaction version has been leaked to the Washington Post.

The report doesn't provide evidence for those who are insisting that things are improving to the point that something resembling success might transpire someday. The "pro-victory" crowd (who are actively harming U.S. national security by trying to keep U.S. forces tied down in Iraq) are deluding themselves and others.

Iraq has failed to meet all but three of 18 congressionally mandated benchmarks for political and military progress, according to a draft of a Government Accountability Office report. The document questions whether some aspects of a more positive assessment by the White House last month adequately reflected the range of views the GAO found within the administration. ...

The draft provides a stark assessment of the tactical effects of the current U.S.-led counteroffensive to secure Baghdad. "While the Baghdad security plan was intended to reduce sectarian violence, U.S. agencies differ on whether such violence has been reduced," it states. While there have been fewer attacks against U.S. forces, it notes, the number of attacks against Iraqi civilians remains unchanged. It also finds that "the capabilities of Iraqi security forces have not improved."

"Overall," the report concludes, "key legislation has not been passed, violence remains high, and it is unclear whether the Iraqi government will spend $10 billion in reconstruction funds," as promised. ...

A GAO spokesman declined to comment on the report before it is released. The 69-page draft, a copy of which was obtained by The Washington Post, is still undergoing review at the Defense Department, which may ask that parts of it be classified or request changes in its conclusions. ...

The person who provided the draft report to The Post said it was being conveyed from a government official who feared that its pessimistic conclusions would be watered down in the final version -- as some officials have said happened with security judgments in this month's National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq. Congress requested the GAO report, along with an assessment of the Iraqi security forces by an independent commission headed by retired Marine Gen. James L. Jones, to provide a basis for comparison with the administration's scorecard. The Jones report is also scheduled for delivery next week. ...

One of eight political benchmarks -- the protection of the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature -- has been achieved, according to the draft. On the others, including legislation on constitutional reform, new oil laws and de-Baathification, it assesses failure.

"Prospects for additional progress in enacting legislative benchmarks have been complicated by the withdrawal of 15 of 37 members of the Iraqi cabinet," it says. An internal administration assessment this month, the GAO says, concluded that "this boycott ends any claim by the Shi'ite-dominated coalition to be a government of national unity." An administration official involved in Iraq policy said that he did not know what specific interagency document the GAO was citing but noted that it is an accurate reflection of the views of many officials.

Overall, the draft report, titled "Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq," says that the Iraqi government has met only two security benchmarks. It contradicts the Bush administration's conclusion in July that sectarian violence was decreasing as a result of the U.S. military's stepped-up operations in Baghdad this year. "The average number of daily attacks against civilians remained about the same over the last six months; 25 in February versus 26 in July," the GAO draft states. ...

The GAO draft also says that the number of Iraqi army units capable of operating independently declined from 10 in March to six last month. The July White House report mentioned a "slight" decline in capable Iraqi units, without providing any numbers. The GAO also says, as did the White House in July, that the Iraqi government has intervened in military activities for political reasons, "resulting in some operations being based on sectarian interests." But its discussion of Iraqi security forces is often veiled, as when it states that the determination that the security forces benchmark was not met "was based largely on classified information."

The description of the Iraqi military's shortcomings contrasts with comments from many senior U.S. commanders who say that they are pleased with its progress. "Although we still have a ways to go, Iraqi security forces are making significant, tangible improvements," Army Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, the No. 2 U.S. commander in Iraq, said earlier this month.

Two Key Reports on Tap for Next Week

The House will hold hearings next week on two key reports assessing political and military conditions in Iraq, jump-starting the debate over President Bush's strategy even before long-awaited testimony by Army Gen. David H. Petraeus and U.S. Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, due the following week.

A completed 70-page report by the Government Accountability Office, to be delivered to Congress next Tuesday, paints a bleak picture of prospects for Iraqi political reconciliation, according to administration officials who have seen it. The second report, by an independent commission of military experts, is being drafted. But a scorecard on the Iraqi security forces released yesterday by an adviser to the group concluded that the Iraqis are years away from taking over significant responsibility from U.S. combat forces. ...

Administration officials said yesterday that the Petraeus-Crocker testimony will closely follow the National Intelligence Estimate judgments released last week, which predicted continued political deterioration in Iraq but cited "measurable but uneven improvements" in the security situation.

The NIE, requested by the White House Iraq coordinator, Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute, in preparation for the testimony, met with resistance from U.S. military officials in Baghdad, according to a senior U.S. military intelligence officer there. Presented with a draft of the conclusions, Petraeus succeeded in having the security judgments softened to reflect improvements in recent months, the official said. ...

In its benchmark legislation last spring, Congress arranged for its own security report, appointing a commission headed by retired Marine Gen. James Jones to assess the Iraqi forces. Strategic and military expert Anthony Cordesman, a commission adviser, previewed that assessment in a report yesterday saying it will be years before the Iraqi army and police forces will be capable of taking over.

The American Idiot

How bizarre:

President Bush's Iraq strategy faces a crisis of faith these days — from the American public. And he is confronting it the way he has previous crises: with a relentless campaign to persuade people to see things his way.

Mr. Bush interrupted his annual August retreat here last week for a speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars replete with historical references to Vietnam, including a surprising citation from Graham Greene's "The Quiet American."

"I never knew a man who had better motives for all the trouble he caused," he quoted from the book, criticizing Mr. Greene for portraying an American character as naïve and dangerous.

LMAO.

I would have sooner expected to hear that Bush had quoted William S. Burroughs than Graham Greene.

Who will he decide to quote next? Regis Debray?

A Going Away Present to the White House From Gen. Peter Pace

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is expected to advise President Bush to reduce the U.S. force in Iraq next year by almost half, potentially creating a rift with top White House officials and other military commanders over the course of the war.

Administration and military officials say Marine Gen. Peter Pace is likely to convey concerns by the Joint Chiefs that keeping well in excess of 100,000 troops in Iraq through 2008 will severely strain the military. This assessment could collide with one being prepared by the U.S. commander in Iraq, Army Gen. David H. Petraeus, calling for the U.S. to maintain higher troop levels for 2008 and beyond.

Petraeus is expected to support a White House view that the absence of widespread political progress in Iraq requires several more months of the U.S. troop buildup before force levels are decreased to their pre-buildup numbers sometime next year.

Pace's recommendations reflect the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who initially expressed private skepticism about the strategy ordered by Bush and directed by Petraeus, before publicly backing it.

According to administration and military officials, the Joint Chiefs believe it is of crucial strategic importance to reduce the size of the U.S. force in Iraq in order to bolster the military's ability to respond to other threats, a view that is shared by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates.

Pace is expected to offer his advice privately instead of issuing a formal report. Still, the position of Pace and the Joint Chiefs could add weight to that of Bush administration critics, including Democratic presidential candidates, that the U.S. force should be reduced.

Those critics include Republican Sen. John W. Warner of Virginia, who on Thursday called on Bush to begin withdrawing troops in September to pressure the Iraqi government to move toward political compromise.

Any discord among the top U.S. generals could be awkward for Bush, who professes to rely heavily on advice from military leaders. But there also is tremendous pressure for military officers to speak with one voice and defer to Petraeus and other field commanders. It remains possible that the Joint Chiefs may opt to weaken their stance before approaching Bush.

According to a senior administration official, the Joint Chiefs in recent weeks have pressed concerns that the Iraq war has degraded the U.S. military's ability to respond, if needed, to other threats, such as Iran.

The chiefs are pushing for a significant decrease in troop levels once the current buildup comes to an end -- perhaps to about half of the 20 combat brigades now in Iraq. Along with support units, that would lower the U.S. presence to fewer than 100,000 troops from the current 162,000.

But military leaders in Iraq, as well as senior officials in the White House, are pushing for troop levels to return to the prior level of about 15 brigades, or about 134,000 troops, once the current buildup is over. ...

Pace was not nominated by Bush for a second term as chairman of the Joint Chiefs and will leave the post at the end of September. He is being succeeded by Adm. Michael G. Mullen, the current Navy chief, who has been even more vocal in his concerns about the stresses on the Army.

Although the role of Defense Department civilian leaders has been highly controversial since the start of the Iraq war, strains between ground commanders and the Pentagon's military brass have been comparatively rare. Previous U.S. commanders in Iraq, such as Petraeus' predecessor, Army Gen. George W. Casey Jr., emphasized low force levels, in part to ensure the overall health of the Army.

Pace has gained a reputation as a consensus builder who is loath to confront civilian leaders on war strategy. With his term nearly up, he is facing his last opportunity to affect the war effort and is stepping up the involvement of the Joint Chiefs in planning for Iraq.

Pace has assigned a handpicked group of high-ranking Iraq combat veterans, known as his "council of colonels," to help formulate the Pentagon military leadership's assessment of current strategy, according to military officials.

Pace created the council last year. Although the chiefs' specific recommendations to Bush were pushed aside then in favor of the troop buildup ordered in January, Pace has asked the council to look at various military problems since then. The process has been credited with reinvigorating the relevance of the Joint Chiefs.

Membership on the council has shifted since last year, and Pentagon officials say Pace now has a fresh group, convened this summer, examining potential changes to Iraq strategy. Past council members have included Army Col. Peter R. Mansoor, who is now Petraeus' executive officer in Baghdad. Officials would not identify the officers now on Pace's panel.

New NIE On Iraq -- Key Judgments

The Key Judgments section (sans portion markings) of an updated NIE on Iraq has been released this afternoon, Prospects for Iraq’s Stability: Some Security Progress but Political Reconciliation Elusive (10-page PDF).

Key Judgments (all emphases in original):

There have been measurable but uneven improvements in Iraq’s security situation since our last National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq in January 2007. The steep escalation of rates of violence has been checked for now, and overall attack levels across Iraq have fallen during seven of the last nine weeks. Coalition forces, working with Iraqi forces, tribal elements, and some Sunni insurgents, have reduced al-Qa’ida in Iraq’s (AQI) capabilities, restricted its freedom of movement, and denied it grassroots support in some areas. However, the level of overall violence, including attacks on and casualties among civilians, remains high; Iraq’s sectarian groups remain unreconciled; AQI retains the ability to conduct high-profile attacks; and to date, Iraqi political leaders remain unable to govern effectively. There have been modest improvements in economic output, budget execution, and government finances but fundamental structural problems continue to prevent sustained progress in economic growth and living conditions.

We assess, to the extent that Coalition forces continue to conduct robust counterinsurgency operations and mentor and support the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), that Iraq’s security will continue to improve modestly during the next six to 12 months but that levels of insurgent and sectarian violence will remain high and the Iraqi Government will continue to struggle to achieve national-level political reconciliation and improved governance. Broadly accepted political compromises required for sustained security, long-term political progress, and economic development are unlikely to emerge unless there is a fundamental shift in the factors driving Iraqi political and security developments.

Political and security trajectories in Iraq continue to be driven primarily by Shia insecurity about retaining political dominance, widespread Sunni unwillingness to accept a diminished political status, factional rivalries within the sectarian communities resulting in armed conflict, and the actions of extremists such as AQI and elements of the Sadrist Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia that try to fuel sectarian violence. Two new drivers have emerged since the January Estimate: expanded Sunni opposition to AQI and Iraqi expectation of a Coalition drawdown. Perceptions that the Coalition is withdrawing probably will encourage factions anticipating a power vacuum to seek local security solutions that could intensify sectarian violence and intra-sectarian competition. At the same time, fearing a Coalition withdrawal, some tribal elements and Sunni groups probably will continue to seek accommodation with the Coalition to strengthen themselves for a post- Coalition security environment.

• Sunni Arab resistance to AQI has expanded in the last six to nine months but has not yet translated into broad Sunni Arab support for the Iraqi Government or widespread willingness to work with the Shia. The Iraqi Government’s Shia leaders fear these groups will ultimately side with armed opponents of the government, but the Iraqi Government has supported some initiatives to incorporate those rejecting AQI into Interior Ministry and Defense Ministry elements.

• Intra-Shia conflict involving factions competing for power and resources probably will intensify as Iraqis assume control of provincial security. In Basrah, violence has escalated with the drawdown of Coalition forces there. Local militias show few signs of reducing their competition for control of valuable oil resources and territory.

• The Sunni Arab community remains politically fragmented, and we see no prospective leaders that might engage in meaningful dialogue and deliver on national agreements.

• Kurdish leaders remain focused on protecting the autonomy of the Kurdish region and reluctant to compromise on key issues.

The IC assesses that the emergence of "bottom-up" security initiatives, principally among Sunni Arabs and focused on combating AQI, represent the best prospect for improved security over the next six to 12 months, but we judge these initiatives will only translate into widespread political accommodation and enduring stability if the Iraqi Government accepts and supports them. A multi-stage process involving the Iraqi Government providing support and legitimacy for such initiatives could foster over the longer term political reconciliation between the participating Sunni Arabs and the national government. We also assess that under some conditions "bottom-up initiatives" could pose risks to the Iraqi Government.

• We judge such initiatives are most likely to succeed in predominantly Sunni Arab areas, where the presence of AQI elements has been significant, tribal networks and identities are strong, the local government is weak, sectarian conflict is low, and the ISF tolerate Sunni initiatives, as illustrated by Al Anbar Province.

• Sunni Arab resistance to AQI has expanded, and neighborhood security groups, occasionally consisting of mixed Shia-Sunni units, have proliferated in the past several months. These trends, combined with increased Coalition operations, have eroded AQI’s operational presence and capabilities in some areas.

• Such initiatives, if not fully exploited by the Iraqi Government, could over time also shift greater power to the regions, undermine efforts to impose central authority, and reinvigorate armed opposition to the Baghdad government.

• Coalition military operations focused on improving population security, both in and outside of Baghdad, will remain critical to the success of local and regional efforts until sectarian fears are diminished enough to enable the Shia-led Iraqi Government to fully support the efforts of local Sunni groups.

Iraqi Security Forces involved in combined operations with Coalition forces have performed adequately, and some units have demonstrated increasing professional competence. However, we judge that the ISF have not improved enough to conduct major operations independent of the Coalition on a sustained basis in multiple locations and that the ISF remain reliant on the Coalition for important aspects of logistics and combat support.

• The deployment of ISF units from throughout Iraq to Baghdad in support of security operations known as Operation Fardh al-Qanun marks significant progress since last year when large groups of soldiers deserted rather than depart their home areas, but Coalition and Iraqi Government support remains critical.

• Recently, the Iraqi military planned and conducted two joint Army and police large-scale security operations in Baghdad, demonstrating an improving capacity for operational command and control.

• Militia and insurgent influences continue to undermine the reliability of some ISF units, and political interference in security operations continues to undermine Coalition and ISF efforts.

• The Maliki government is implementing plans to expand the Iraqi Army and to increase its overall personnel strength to address critical gaps, but we judge that significant security gains from those programs will take at least six to 12 months, and probably longer, to materialize.

The IC assesses that the Iraqi Government will become more precarious over the next six to 12 months because of criticism by other members of the major Shia coalition (the Unified Iraqi Alliance, UIA), Grand Ayatollah Sistani, and other Sunni and Kurdish parties. Divisions between Maliki and the Sadrists have increased, and Shia factions have explored alternative coalitions aimed at constraining Maliki.

• The strains of the security situation and absence of key leaders have stalled internal political debates, slowed national decisionmaking, and increased Maliki’s vulnerability to alternative coalitions.

• We judge that Maliki will continue to benefit from recognition among Shia leaders that searching for a replacement could paralyze the government.

Population displacement resulting from sectarian violence continues, imposing burdens on provincial governments and some neighboring states and increasing the danger of destabilizing influences spreading across Iraq’s borders over the next six to 12 months. The polarization of communities is most evident in Baghdad, where the Shia are a clear majority in more than half of all neighborhoods and Sunni areas have become surrounded by predominately Shia districts. Where population displacements have led to significant sectarian separation, conflict levels have diminished to some extent because warring communities find it more difficult to penetrate communal enclaves.

The IC assesses that Iraq’s neighbors will continue to focus on improving their leverage in Iraq in anticipation of a Coalition drawdown. Assistance to armed groups, especially from Iran, exacerbates the violence inside Iraq, and the reluctance of the Sunni states that are generally supportive of US regional goals to offer support to the Iraqi Government probably bolsters Iraqi Sunni Arabs’ rejection of the government’s legitimacy.

• Over the next year Tehran, concerned about a Sunni reemergence in Iraq and US efforts to limit Iranian influence, will continue to provide funding, weaponry, and training to Iraqi Shia militants. Iran has been intensifying aspects of its lethal support for select groups of Iraqi Shia militants, particularly the JAM, since at least the beginning of 2006. Explosively formed penetrator (EFP) attacks have risen dramatically.

• Syria has cracked down on some Sunni extremist groups attempting to infiltrate fighters into Iraq through Syria because of threats they pose to Syrian stability, but the IC now assesses that Damascus is providing support to non-AQI groups inside Iraq in a bid to increase Syrian influence.

• Turkey probably would use a range of measures to protect what it perceives as its interests in Iraq. The risk of cross-border operations against the People’s Congress of Kurdistan (KG) terrorist group based in northern Iraq remains.

We assess that changing the mission of Coalition forces from a primarily counterinsurgency and stabilization role to a primary combat support role for Iraqi forces and counterterrorist operations to prevent AQI from establishing a safehaven would erode security gains achieved thus far. The impact of a change in mission on Iraq’s political and security environment and throughout the region probably would vary in intensity and suddenness of onset in relation to the rate and scale of a Coalition redeployment. Developments within the Iraqi communities themselves will be decisive in determining political and security trajectories.

• Recent security improvements in Iraq, including success against AQI, have depended significantly on the close synchronization of conventional counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. A change of mission that interrupts that synchronization would place security improvements at risk.

Grasping at Historical Straws

President Bush's address to the VFW yesterday was a typical [for him] exercise in shamelessness. His comparison of the noble Iraq war to previous U.S. wars was historically and conceptually flawed, to put it mildly.

The American withdrawal from Vietnam is widely remembered as an ignominious end to a misguided war — but one with few negative repercussions for the United States and its allies.

Now, in urging Americans to stay the course in Iraq, President Bush is challenging that historical memory.

In reminding Americans that the pullout in 1975 was followed by years of bloody upheaval in Southeast Asia, Mr. Bush argued in a speech on Wednesday that Vietnam's lessons provide a reason for persevering in Iraq, rather than for leaving any time soon. Mr. Bush in essence accused his war critics of amnesia over the exodus of Vietnamese "boat people" refugees and the mass killings in Cambodia that upended the lives of millions of people. ...

President Bush is right on the factual record, according to historians. But many of them also quarreled with his drawing analogies from the causes of that turmoil to predict what might happen in Iraq should the United States withdraw.

"It is undoubtedly true that America’s failure in Vietnam led to catastrophic consequences in the region, especially in Cambodia," said David C. Hendrickson, a specialist on the history of American foreign policy at Colorado College in Colorado Springs.

"But there are a couple of further points that need weighing," he added. "One is that the Khmer Rouge would never have come to power in the absence of the war in Vietnam — this dark force arose out of the circumstances of the war, was in a deep sense created by the war. The same thing has happened in the Middle East today. Foreign occupation of Iraq has created far more terrorists than it has deterred." ...

[T]he American drawdown from Vietnam was hardly abrupt, and it lasted much longer than many people remember. The withdrawal actually began in 1968, after the Tet offensive, which was a military defeat for the Communist guerrillas and their North Vietnamese sponsors. But it also illustrated the vulnerability of the United States and its South Vietnamese allies.

Although American commanders asked for several hundred thousand reinforcements after Tet, President Johnson turned them down. President Nixon began a process of "Vietnamization" in which responsibility for security was gradually handed to local military and police forces — similar to Mr. Bush's long-term strategy for Iraq today.

American air power was used to help sustain South Vietnam's struggling government, but by the time of the famous photograph of Americans being lifted off a roof in Saigon in 1975, few American combat forces were left in Vietnam. "It was not a precipitous withdrawal, it was a very deliberate disengagement," said Andrew J. Bacevich, a platoon leader in Vietnam who is now a professor of international relations at Boston University.

Vietnam today is a unified and stable nation whose Communist government poses little threat to its neighbors and is developing healthy ties with the United States. Mr. Bush visited Vietnam last November; a return visit to the White House this summer by Nguyen Minh Triet was the first visit by a Vietnamese head of state since the war.

There is one Vietnam analogy that unfortunately does apply. U.S. frustration over Prime Minister Nouri Maliki's failures surely rivals the disdain President Kennedy had for the first South Vietnamese president, Ngo Dinh Diem. We can only hope the Maliki-Diem analogy proves false, because Diem was ousted in a CIA-approved military coup, then executed. Perhaps Maliki is better compared with the last South Vietnamese leader, Nguyen Van Thieu? The hated Thieu never managed to make "Vietnamization" work -- and the U.S. refused to keep 500,000 troops in South Vietnam for another decade or three to help him.

The real lesson of Vietnam is that its civil war was a nationalist struggle that toppled no communist "dominoes" across Asia. Bush's rhetoric implying an Al Qaeda "domino effect" in the Middle East has the same false ring.

President Bush also tried to make a misleading analogy yesterday between the Iraq war and the Korean conflict. A rebuttal:

Eisenhower ran on a promise that he would go to Korea personally with the purpose of ending what had become an extremely unpopular war.

Eisenhower did just that, traveling to Korea before he was even sworn in as president. By the following summer, with his support and encouragement, a rough peace was achieved. Unfortunately, more than half a century later, the U.S. continues to spend billions of dollars annually to maintain a massive military presence in the region.

Bush did not criticize Eisenhower in his speech to the VFW, presumably because he is no more familiar with the 34th president than he is with I.F. Stone. But if he does actually develop an interest in the period of history he referenced today, the current president might be intrigued by two of his predecessor's statements from the era.

"When people speak to you about a preventive war, you tell them to go and fight it. After my experience, I have come to hate war. ... War settles nothing," explained the old military man.

Eisenhower rejected the argument that keeping up the fight in Korea was necessary to protecting America, and he counseled that a permanent commitment to fighting abroad would ... cost America dearly.

"Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed," Eisenhower declared in the spring of 1953, as he was dialing down the Korea conflict. "This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children. [...] This is not a way of life at all in any true sense. Under the clouds of war, it is humanity hanging on a cross of iron."

Counterproductive U.S. Actions Cause Failure in "War on Terror"

The US is losing the war on terror. That's the assessment of the nation's top foreign-policy, intelligence, and national-security leaders from across the ideological spectrum. In this year's Terrorism Index, a survey released Monday by Foreign Policy magazine, 84 percent of these experts believe the nation is losing the war on terror, while more than 90 percent say the world is growing more dangerous for Americans.

That's prompted a variety of leaders to call for a complete rethinking of the nation's strategy. And some are looking back to the cold war's battle against communism to find models for the ideological struggle against terrorism.

A key component is deterrence, the policy that, at the height of the cold war, kept the superpowers' nuclear warheads safely in their bunkers – the only way to avoid mutually assured destruction (MAD). Another is a call for a Middle East Marshall Plan to help develop the region's economies and confront the alienation of the young.

"We need a grand strategy to address not only the question of al Qaeda, but also, how do you put out the fires in the region?" says Fawaz Gerges, a Middle East expert at New York's Sarah Lawrence College. "How do you diffuse the crisis and help the Muslims in order to counterbalance the militant ideologies that are simmering above the surface and below the surface?"

The Terrorism Index was developed by Foreign Policy magazine and the Center for American Progress a year ago, as a way to gauge progress in the war on terror. The original idea was to determine whether the nation was deterring, capturing, or killing more terrorists each day than were being recruited, trained, and deployed. Such information proved nearly impossible to obtain. So the groups decided to survey top foreign-policy, intelligence, military, and academic experts on their sense of progress.

This is the third Terrorism Index they have issued. Among its findings are that foreign-policy experts "see a world that is growing more dangerous, a national security strategy in disrepair, and a war in Iraq that is alarmingly off course," according to the magazine.

"The main reason for this pessimism appears to be events on the ground," says Mike Boyer, senior editor of Foreign Policy. "Eighty-three percent of the experts say the surge of troops into Baghdad is having a negative impact on the war effort, an increase of 22 percent from just six months ago." The sentiment crosses party lines, he says. So, too, does a desire to disengage from Iraq. Seven out of 10 experts surveyed believe it's time to draw down forces there, although a majority do not favor an immediate withdrawal.

Experts are also blaming the war in Iraq for a diminishing sense of security in America. Eighty percent of them say the war has had a negative effect "on protecting the American people from global terrorist networks and in advancing U.S. national security goals." Only 15 percent of the experts say that creating a stable, secure Iraq should be the top foreign-policy objective of the next five years. In contrast, 30 percent believe that winning the "hearts and minds" of the Muslim world should be the most important US policy objective in that time frame.

These and other conclusions, says Mr. Boyer, indicate that the Iraq experience is informing experts' broader views on the war on terrorism – and prompting calls for new strategies.

"This poll presents an enormously bleak and melancholy picture ... and it's difficult not to read it as a complete repudiation of the entire current conduct on the war on terrorism," says Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism expert at Georgetown University. "Where we have been particularly remiss or ineffectual is in fighting the al Qaeda brand as hard as we've fought the al Qaeda terrorists."

Middle East experts like Dr. Gerges say that while the majority of Muslims reject al Qaeda's violence, they have come to believe that much of al Qaeda's rhetoric is correct. "The US is losing the ideological struggle against al Qaeda," says Gerges. "Some of the most intelligent people in that part of the world believe the US is waging a crusade against Islam and Muslims and is trying to subjugate the Arab world and remake it in its image, and that it's doing it brutally."

Many experts say it's critical that the US focus on countering such perceptions. The solution lies in changing US policy in the region and supporting Islamic scholars who can show how al Qaeda is distorting the Koran.

"Once you strip the adversary of their extremist message of religion, there's nothing left but criminality and thuggery," says Frank Cilluffo, director of the Homeland Security Policy Institute at George Washington University. "There's growing recognition this needs to be done, but we haven't marshaled and mobilized those resources as much as we ought to." Some scholars believe a comprehensive strategy should include a massive economic and social investment similar to the Marshall Plan after World War II. They also think it's crucial to develop a strategy of deterrence.

"Deterrence is probably the hardest part of counterterrorism," says John McLaughlin, former acting director of the CIA. "Classical deterrence in the past worked against adversaries who played by certain rules and didn't want to die. Here, you're up against an adversary who plays by no particular rules and is willing to die."

It's equally important to combat the terrorist narrative, he says. Others agree and again point to the findings of the Terrorism Index.

"Part of the results ... is a warning that we must change our strategy, or otherwise we'll be ... fighting this struggle ad infinitum," says Hoffman.


The Terrorism Index (Foreign Policy magazine).

Nice Timing

The White House said Monday that Gen. David Petraeus likely will testify before Congress on the sixth anniversary of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

A spokesman for President Bush, Gordon Johndroe, reiterated that Petraeus, the commander of U.S. troops in Iraq, and Ryan Crocker, U.S. ambassador to Iraq, would testify in open hearings. They will answer lawmakers’ questions about the situation in Iraq, the success of the troop surge and the next steps to be taken.

The highly anticipated report from Petraeus and Crocker is seen as a potential turning point in America’s involvement in Iraq. Several Republicans, who so far have refused to side with Democratic calls for withdrawal, have said they wanted to hear from Petraeus and Crocker before making any decisions regarding U.S. troop levels.

Democrats last week tried to make an issue of whether Petraeus and Crocker would testify in open session and attempted to paint the administration as trying to stifle such testimony. However, the White House was quick to respond that no such plans had been made.

According to Johndroe, the fact that the pair likely will appear before Congress on Sept. 11 has nothing to do with the anniversary of the attack, but was rather dictated by Congress’s tight schedule.

ACLU Obtains New Details of Possible Cover-Up of Iraqi Prisoner Abuse

Documents obtained by the American Civil Liberties Union provide new evidence of a possible "cover-up" of Iraqi prisoner abuse by U.S. forces in 2003, and suggest that senior military officials failed to act promptly upon receiving reports of the abuse. The documents, obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, also reveal that an Army investigator found that the conditions of prisoners held in isolation at Abu Ghraib qualified as torture.

"These documents make clear that prisoners were abused in U.S. custody not only at Abu Ghraib, but also in other locations in Iraq," said Amrit Singh, an attorney with the ACLU. "Rather than putting a stop to these abuses, senior officials appear to have turned a blind eye to them."

The documents detail Army Office of Inspector General investigations of alleged improprieties by Major General Barbara Fast, Major General Walter Wojdakowski and Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez. These investigations were initiated by the Department of Defense, after the 2004 Abu Ghraib scandal, and absolved all three officers of blame.

The inquiry into Major General Barbara Fast, the top intelligence officer attached to U.S. command in Iraq at the time the Abu Ghraib abuses occurred, provides new details of her role in responding to reports of prisoner abuse in the vicinity of the Baghdad International Airport in the summer of 2003. The outcome of the investigation illustrates the Defense Department’s refusal to hold her, or any other senior military officials, responsible for failing to put a stop to the known abuses, said the ACLU.

The inquiry into Fast also includes the testimony of a colonel who compiled a report in November 2003 that documented potential abuse of Iraqi detainees by a joint Special Operations and CIA unit looking for weapons of mass destruction. Although the colonel's name was blacked out throughout the records, the ACLU believes this testimony is from retired Colonel Stuart Herrington.

The colonel maintains that someone called him in late November with details of prisoner abuse that occurred in June or July of 2003 in the vicinity of Baghdad International Airport. The colonel's source had previously complained about the abuse to Major General Dayton, Commander of the Iraq Survey Group in charge of the hunt for weapons of mass destruction. The source had also reported the abuse to the Defense Intelligence Agency Chain of Command in Clarendon.

The colonel says that he met with Fast in late 2003 to brief her on his investigation and that he gave her a copy of his report. Subsequently, the Judge Advocate General's office attached to U.S. Command in Iraq informed the colonel that it had found "no evidence to support the allegations that detainees were mistreated." The colonel dismissed this conclusion as a "cover-up" and expressed "blunt dismay." He could not fathom how his own report could be taken so lightly given that he had provided names of the witnesses and "already had two people who admitted it."

The colonel testifies, moreover, that it was not until after the abuses of Abu Ghraib were made public, almost six months after he gave Fast the report, that she acknowledged finding his report in her e-mail account for the first time. Fast told him that she had not recognized his name and that she came across the e-mail while she was refreshing her memory on Abu Ghraib. The colonel testifies that he internally questioned the veracity of Fast's claim of not having seen the report and whether "in light of the Abu Ghraib thing is this something here that's convenient and comfortable?" However, based on his personal evaluation of her character, he decided that Fast must be telling the truth.

The Army Inspector General report clears Fast of all allegations of misconduct and concludes that Fast took prompt action to alert the proper authorities once she was informed of the alleged abuse.

Additional documents made public today by the ACLU reveal that Major General George Fay found that the conditions under which Abu Ghraib prisoners were isolated went far beyond the limits of abuse and were, in fact, torturous. Fay is quoted in the investigation as saying, "But what was actually being done at Abu Ghraib was they were placing people in their cells naked and they were - those cells they were placing them in, in many instances were unlit. No light whatsoever. And they were like a refrigerator in the wintertime and an oven in the summertime because they had no outside form of ventilation. And you actually had to go outside the building to get to this place they called the 'hole,' and were literally placing people into it. So, what they thought was just isolation was actually abuse because it's - actually in some instances, it was torturous. Because they were putting a naked person into an oven or a naked person into a refrigerator. That qualifies in my opinion as torture. Not just abuse."

Fay also says that a memo from then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld authorizing removal of clothing created a "mindset" in which that kind of humiliation was considered an "acceptable technique." He notes that even though Rumsfeld later rescinded the memo, not everyone received notice that the interrogation of naked prisoners was no longer permissible.

In addition to the documents made public today, the ACLU's Freedom of Information Act lawsuit has resulted in the release of thousands of pages of government documents detailing the torture and abuse of detainees. The ACLU has created a search engine for the public to access the documents at www­.aclu.org/torturefoia/search/search.html

The ACLU brought the FOIA lawsuit in October 2003 with the Center for Constitutional Rights, Physicians for Human Rights, Veterans for Common Sense and Veterans for Peace. The New York Civil Liberties Union is co-counsel in the case.

In addition to Singh, attorneys in the FOIA case are Lawrence Lustberg and Melanca Clark of the New Jersey-based law firm Gibbons, P.C.; Jameel Jaffer and Judy Rabinovitz of the ACLU; Arthur Eisenberg and Beth Haroules of the NYCLU; and Barbara Olshansky of the Center for Constitutional Rights.

The documents are available online at: http://www.aclu.org/safefree/torture/31303res20070815.html
(PDFs)

Washington's Political Plan for Pakistan

A U.S.-brokered partnership between General Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto to share (at least nominally) the leadership of Pakistan has been under construction for several months now. (See Report: Washington Arranged Musharraf-Bhutto Alliance)

As usual when the U.S. attempts grand international political initiatives, failure is pre-engineered into the blueprint.

Keeping Musharraf in power is the goal -- and the main weakness of the plan.

While Washington's main concern ... is keeping Pakistan on its side in the fight against terrorism, there is also a desire to help a key U.S. ally -- Musharraf -- in trouble.

The Bush administration believes an alliance with Bhutto could give Musharraf his best chance of defusing the domestic crisis and remaining president.

Diplomatic circles in Washington say the Musharraf-Bhutto deal is almost ready and can be announced soon. But the issue that can derail the arrangement -- Musharraf retaining his position as the army chief -- remains unresolved.

While addressing a gathering at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York earlier this week, Bhutto expressed her frustration at the general's reluctance to resolve this issue.

"Time is running out. Is it just talk, or is it going to turn into a walk?" she asked, adding it was important to conclude the negotiations this month because "we are risking our popularity even by having this dialogue."

A senior government minister in Islamabad called Bhutto's comments political posturing. He, however, conceded the president is thinking about the issue.

Musharraf and Bhutto met last month in Abu Dhabi, in the United Arab Emirates, to finalize a deal for power-sharing. Reports in the Pakistani media say not only did the United States arrange the deal, but a U.S. representative also attended the meeting as a moderator.

Officials in both Islamabad and Washington refused to comment on such reports but acknowledge Musharraf and Bhutto are talking to each other and the United States backs these talks.

Since early this month, Bhutto has been in New York apparently to spend some time with her husband who lives there. But she also has launched a major media offensive, sometimes giving half a dozen interviews a day, to explain why she, an opposition politician, is negotiating with a general.

"General Musharraf says and has committed himself to a Pakistan following a moderate path," she said. "To that extent, if we could get the moderate forces to work together for a transition to democracy I think, in the present circumstances, it would be helpful."

Sources in her Pakistan People's Party say Bhutto moved to New York also because this enables her to stay in touch with both Pakistani and U.S. officials while conducting indirect talks with Islamabad over the proposed deal.

The deal, if finalized, would allow her to return home, participate in the elections scheduled later this year, and then head a coalition government as prime minister.

But before she embarks upon this journey of political rehabilitation to a country she left in 1996 amid allegations of flagrant corruption and widespread kleptocracy, Musharraf has to change the constitution to accommodate her.

An amendment he made after toppling another elected prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, in October 1999 bars a third term as prime minister. Both Bhutto and Sharif have had two terms each, though they never completed a full term of five years.

The government also has to drop corruption charges against her and assure her she will not be arrested if she returns.

In a recent interview, Bhutto listed some of the confidence-building measures she expects Musharraf to take to facilitate the deal, urging him to lift restrictions on political party leaders such as herself and grant "indemnity for all parliamentarians and for all holders of public office."

"For us and him to work together, there have to be these gestures," Bhutto said.

Even if such measures are taken, there will still be the issue of Musharraf retaining two positions simultaneously -- the president and the army chief.

For Bhutto to agree to work under a president who is also an army chief will be political suicide. She will have no power but will have to share the responsibility for all popular and unpopular measures the government takes, particularly in the fight against terrorism.

The U.S.-led war against terrorism is not popular in Pakistan. Actively pursuing this war will hurt her popularity. If she agrees to take this risk, the least she would expect is to have some real power, which current Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz does not have.

Aziz is a political nonentity. He is there because of Musharraf’s support, without which he cannot win even a local government seat from anywhere in Pakistan.

Bhutto, however, has a strong political base in all four provinces, which even years of anti-Bhutto campaigning by successive governments failed to erode.

Besides, Bhutto also knows Musharraf needs her more than she needs him to deal with the current political crisis, which started with the suspension of the chief justice two months ago and refuses to go away.

So she is unlikely to accept Musharraf both as president and the army chief. If Washington wants a deal between her and Musharraf, it will have to convince the general to quit the army and work under a prime minister as a civilian president.

The question is: Will Musharraf agree to do so? After all, in a British parliamentary system that Pakistan follows, the president has no power.

All indications are the United States is trying to help evolve a formula that distributes power between Musharraf and Bhutto.

This new arrangement, if finalized, will be different from the traditional British parliamentary system because it will have a distribution of power between the president and the prime minister.

Even if this arrangement is made, there is no guarantee it will succeed. Both Musharraf and Bhutto are strong-willed people not accustomed to taking orders. It will be particularly difficult for Musharraf, who has ruled Pakistan since 1999 as an autocrat, to share power with a civilian politician he has never respected.

The Supreme Court of Pakistan is already exerting pressure upon Musharraf to step down at the end of his term, in accordance with that nation's constitution.

People in Washington and Islamabad who know a lot more about Pakistan than U.S. policymakers say that a complete return to civilian political rule wouldn't be the disaster that many here see. The religious parties do not have the influence to take control of the country.

The Pakistani public desires civilian secular control -- viz the protests over Musharraf's dismissal of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court recently.

The U.S. can't bring itself to avoid deciding who should lead the people of Pakistan. That doesn't mean we have the foresight to make the best picks.

U.S. Unilateralism Criticized

Iran used the meeting of a regional security organization here on Thursday to lash out at American plans for a missile defense shield, while President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia took an indirect swipe at what he calls Washington's unilateral foreign policy.

Speaking at the one-day annual summit meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran said the planned defense system, to be based in Eastern Europe, was "a threat to more than one country," asserting that it would affect "a large part of Asia and S.C.O. members."

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, established six years ago, brings together Russia and China, as well as the former Soviet republics of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, under the banner of combating terrorism and fostering regional collaboration. Iran has observer status in the group.

This week the group is conducting joint military exercises in Chelyabinsk, Russia, involving more than 6,000 troops.

Beyond its security aspect, the organization has provided a forum for criticism of United States policies. At its 2005 meeting in Kazakhstan, members demanded that Washington provide a timetable for ending its military presence in Central Asia.

Without mentioning the United States directly, Mr. Putin called for a "multipolar" world order, in line with his frequent criticisms of what he considers the Bush administration's unilateral foreign policies. "Any attempts to solve global and regional problems unilaterally are hopeless," he said.

A joint statement at the conference's end said that "modern challenges and security threats can only be effectively countered through united efforts of the international community."

Analysts say the group hopes to become a counterweight to Western influence in the energy-rich and increasingly strategic Central Asian countries.

What unites the group's countries "are genuine common concerns about security, about border issues and about trade and energy," said Michael Hall, a Central Asia expert formerly with the International Crisis Group in Bishkek. "There is a certain sense of wanting to let the U.S. know that they're a force to be reckoned with."

Russia and China are eager to secure Central Asia's considerable energy reserves for their own use, and Russia wants to maintain pre-eminence in a region it has long considered within its traditional sphere of influence.

This week, officials at the China National Petroleum Corporation announced that China and Turkmenistan, the second-largest gas producer in the former Soviet Union, would form working groups to help supply China with 30 billion cubic meters of gas annually over 30 years.

Moscow has locked up long-term gas supply contracts with Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in an effort to replenish its dwindling supplies, and it recently reached an agreement to pipe Turkmen gas through Russia.

The pipeline deal in particular was considered a commercial coup and a setback to the United States, which hopes to ship Turkmenistan's gas across the Caspian Sea to European markets.

White House Doesn't Want Petraeus To Testify in Public

The administration is getting jittery about the prospect of the country hearing the unvarnished (congressionally mandated) testimony of Gen. Petraeus in September.

Senior congressional aides said yesterday that the White House has proposed limiting the much-anticipated appearance on Capitol Hill next month of Gen. David H. Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker to a private congressional briefing, suggesting instead that the Bush administration's progress report on the Iraq war should be delivered to Congress by the secretaries of state and defense.

White House officials did not deny making the proposal in informal talks with Congress, but they said yesterday that they will not shield the commanding general in Iraq and the senior U.S. diplomat there from public congressional testimony required by the war-funding legislation President Bush signed in May. ...

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.) told the White House that Bush's presentation plan was unacceptable. An aide to Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl M. Levin (D-Mich.) said that "we are in talks with the administration and . . . Senator Levin wants an open hearing" with Petraeus.

Those positions only hardened yesterday with reports that the document would not be written by the Army general but instead would come from the White House, with input from Petraeus, Crocker and other administration officials. ...

Petraeus and Crocker have said repeatedly that they plan to testify after delivering private assessments to Bush. U.S. military and diplomatic officials in Baghdad appeared puzzled yesterday when told that the White House had indicated that the two may not be appearing in public. They said they will continue to prepare for the testimony in the absence of instructions from Washington. "If anything, we just don't know the dates/times/or the committees that the assessment will be presented to," a senior military official in Baghdad said in an e-mail yesterday. ...

Speaking to reporters traveling with him in Iraq yesterday, Petraeus said he is preparing recommendations on troop levels while getting ready to go to Washington next month. He declined to give specifics.

"We know that the surge has to come to an end," Petraeus said, according to the Associated Press. "I think everyone understands that, by about a year or so from now, we've got to be a good bit smaller than we are right now. The question is how do you do that . . . so that you can retain the gains we have fought so hard to achieve and so you can keep going."

U.S. To Designate Iranian Revolutionary Guards "Terrorist" Group

Robin Wright -- the chief Washington-based journalistic heavy lifter in the anti-Iran Information Operation -- has been tossed a bone by her "sources" and gets to break the news of an important development in the U.S./Iran confrontation.

The United States has decided to designate Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, the country's 125,000-strong elite military branch, as a "specially designated global terrorist," according to U.S. officials, a move that allows Washington to target the group's business operations and finances. ...

The designation of the Revolutionary Guard will be made under Executive Order 13224, which President Bush signed two weeks after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks to obstruct terrorist funding. It authorizes the United States to identify individuals, businesses, charities and extremist groups engaged in terrorist activities. The Revolutionary Guard would be the first national military branch included on the list, U.S. officials said -- a highly unusual move because it is part of a government, rather than a typical non-state terrorist organization.

The order allows the United States to block the assets of terrorists and to disrupt operations by foreign businesses that "provide support, services or assistance to, or otherwise associate with, terrorists." ...

The main goal of the new designation is to clamp down on the Revolutionary Guard's vast business network, as well as on foreign companies conducting business linked to the military unit and its personnel. The administration plans to list many of the Revolutionary Guard's financial operations. ...

For weeks, the Bush administration has been debating whether to target the Revolutionary Guard Corps in full, or only its Quds Force wing, which U.S. officials have linked to the growing flow of explosives, roadside bombs, rockets and other arms to Shiite militias in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Quds Force also lends support to Shiite allies such as Lebanon's Hezbollah and to Sunni movements such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

Although administration discussions continue, the initial decision is to target the entire Guard Corps, U.S. officials said. The administration has not yet decided when to announce the new measure, but officials said they would prefer to do so before the meeting of the U.N. General Assembly next month, when the United States intends to increase international pressure against Iran. ...

"They are heavily involved in everything from pharmaceuticals to telecommunications and pipelines -- even the new Imam Khomeini Airport and a great deal of smuggling," said Ray Takeyh of the Council on Foreign Relations. "Many of the front companies engaged in procuring nuclear technology are owned and run by the Revolutionary Guards. They're developing along the lines of the Chinese military, which is involved in many business enterprises. It's a huge business conglomeration." ...

Dozens of international banks and financial institutions reduced or eliminated their business with Iran after a quiet campaign by the Treasury Department and State Department aimed at limiting Tehran's access to the international financial system. ...

The administration's move comes amid growing support in Congress for the Iran Counter-Proliferation Act, which was introduced in the Senate by Gordon Smith (R-Ore.) and in the House by Tom Lantos (D-Calif.). The bill already has the support of 323 House members.

The administration's move could hurt diplomatic efforts, some analysts said. "It would greatly complicate our efforts to solve the nuclear issue," said Joseph Cirincione, a nuclear proliferation expert at the Center for American Progress. "It would tie an end to Iran's nuclear program to an end to its support of allies in Hezbollah and Hamas. The only way you could get a nuclear deal is as part of a grand bargain, which at this point is completely out of reach."

U.K. Parliament Report Says 'Surge' Will Fail

This might be good to throw in the faces of some U.S. lawmakers in September when they inevitably swear that the "surge" is working.

The U.S. military "surge" in Iraq, which added 30,000 troops to quell an insurgency, probably will fail, a panel of lawmakers in the U.K. Parliament said.

"It is too early to provide a definitive assessment of the U.S. 'surge' but it does not look likely to succeed," the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee wrote in a report. Success "will ultimately ride on whether Iraq's politicians are able to reach agreement on a number of key issues."

The cross-party panel of lawmakers called on Prime Minister Gordon Brown to set out a policy to promote reconciliation between rival political factions in Iraq.

The U.S. force in Iraq reached 162,000 soldiers last week, the most since the war begin in 2003. President George W. Bush faces a deadline to show progress made from his surge strategy by September, when General David Petraeus, the U.S. commander in Iraq, will give Congress an assessment.

The U.K. has been lowering its troop levels in the south of Iraq, from 46,000 at the peak of combat operations four years ago to 5,500 at the end of May.

The committee also attacked the international boycott of the Palestinian unity government between Fatah and the militant Hamas movement when it was formed in March. President Mahmoud Abbas dissolved the unity government after Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip in June, effectively splitting Palestinian territories.

"All the boycott of the National Unity government did was to strengthen the extremists and undermine the moderates," committee chairman Mike Gapes said in an interview.

Russia is the only member of the Middle East Quartet of international mediators that maintains ties with Hamas, which is considered a terrorist organization by the U.S. and European Union.

The panel also criticized the government of former Prime Minister Tony Blair for refusing to call for an immediate cease-fire when Israel launched retaliatory attacks on Lebanon last year.

Paging Dr. West

I bet the government is lamenting the loss of Dr. "Jolly" West right about now. He seemed to always be able to smooth over this type of flap.

Jose Padilla had no history of mental illness when President Bush ordered him detained in 2002 as a suspected Al Qaeda operative. But he does now.

The Muslim convert was subjected to prison conditions and interrogation techniques that took him past the breaking point, mental health experts say. ...

Padilla's treatment in the brig is classified as a state secret.

Ironically, no one knows this better than Padilla himself. When Hegarty, the psychiatrist, asked him about his interrogation in the brig, Padilla responded: "I can't talk about what happened to me because it is classified."

Although Padilla has been meeting with his Miami lawyers for more than a year and a half, he refuses to discuss his treatment in the brig in any detail.

The torture allegations made last year in the Miami court case were raised as a result of repeated sessions asking Padilla "yes or no" whether he'd endured the kinds of harsh interrogation tactics reported in the press. He reluctantly answered yes to some, and no to others. But his lawyers could pry no details or narrative from him.

They asked [forensic psychiatrist, Angela] Hegarty for help.

She spent days attempting to establish a rapport, days trying to get him to open up. "The first two hours were utterly useless each day. I got no data at all," Hegarty says. Eventually he would relax and talk about relatively minor subjects. When Hegarty tried to steer him toward the brig or the evidence in his criminal case "he would just stop, change the subject, and twitch," she said.

During her week-long effort, Hegarty would arrive each morning to discover Padilla once again unwilling to talk. She says the experience was like the movie "Groundhog Day," in which the same events repeat over and over. "The 22 hours I spent with him, it was like it never happened," Hegarty says. "It was chilling."

Grassian relates in his report that Padilla's mother found it emotionally difficult to visit her son in Miami because it involved observing his diminished mental condition. Padilla tried to reassure her that he was fine, that the government was treating him very well. At one point, Grassian says, Padilla suggested that his mother write directly to Bush to help her speed through red tape to arrange her next visit. The president was sure to help her out, Padilla assured his mother.

"It was utterly irrational," Grassian writes in his report. "After all, it was President Bush who had ordered him detained as an enemy combatant."

Padilla's mother became increasingly anxious. Finally she confronted her son: "Did they torture you?" she asked.

"He turned towards her, his face grimacing, his eyes blinking, and in panic and rage he demanded: 'Don't you ever, ever, ask that question again,' " the Grassian report says.

The Road To Damascus

The RCMP yesterday admitted for the first time that it worked with the CIA during the Maher Arar affair. Suggestions of CIA involvement have been public since the Ottawa engineer provided convincing evidence he was flown to the Middle East on a CIA Gulfstream jet after his arrest in a U.S. airport, but yesterday was the first occasion there has been official confirmation to support his accusations.

Ottawa officials had insisted on keeping a lid on the fact that Canada was working with the Central Intelligence Agency on the case, arguing such confirmation would work against national security. There was no such compunction over citing assistance with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, but the government decided the CIA, a clandestine spy organization, deserved greater protection because of its different rules of engagement.

Canadian security officials suggest the reason the CIA was granted blanket protection was because of a cardinal rule in intelligence gathering - namely the third-party rule, whereby the work of foreign spies must not be compromised through public mention of their work. The FBI has routinely shared its work under established rules with Canadian police forces, but this was the first time RCMP officers involved in the Arar debacle had worked with the CIA and as a result, they argued it essential that a blanket ban be put in place.

The Syrian-Canadian was among five Canadian Arabs who were jailed and interrogated in Syria at various points between 2001 and 2003. Most had flown there voluntarily. But Mr. Arar arrived only after being sent to the Middle East in shackles, on a CIA Gulfstream jet, after his arrest in a U.S. airport. These detentions occurred during an almost perfect storm of fear and the rethinking of standard protocols.

Agents were picking up information about a "second wave" of al-Qaeda attacks. U.S. Vice-President Dick Cheney stated the CIA had to contemplate working on "the dark side." Certain Canadian agents came to believe walls that had separated their investigations from U.S. ones had come down.

And Syria, a pariah nation known for flouting human rights, saw an opportunity. During a brief thaw in relations after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorism attacks in the United States, Damascus claimed to have provided valuable intelligence about an al-Qaeda bomb plot against a target in Ottawa - an apparent reference to statements procured from a Canadian suspect, Ahmad Abou El Maati, who now says he was tortured into false admissions.

Some U.S. officials, such as Syrian expert Flynt Leverett, have gone on record praising the information Damascus provided Washington in this period. Other U.S. security officials disagree. "That relationship never produced significant useful information," said Bruce Riedel, a Mideast expert who retired from the CIA last year.

Whatever the case, the thaw didn't last. During the 2003 Iraq war, Syria became the main entry point for fighters wanting to take on U.S. forces.

The Arar commission found that at one juncture, Canadian police directly sent questions to Syria to be put to one of the Canadian suspects.

"Sending someone to Syria is a pretty extreme solution to the problem of interrogation," Mr. Riedel said. The regime, he said, is well known to be "much less interested in information than they are in confession."

"They are not truth seekers, they are guilt seekers," added Mr. Riedel, now a senior fellow with the Brookings Institution.

"That should set off big red flags. You are asking for trouble and you are asking for Syrians to manipulate you. They [the Syrians] are not stupid. They know how to play a sucker when they see one."

The Hologram

From a new piece by Joe Bageant:

But having been in the media business one way or another for almost 40 years, and having watched it increasingly take on a life of its own, I know that nothing of significance in the news is what it appears to be. This is not the result of some media conspiracy, mind you, but rather that the people working in the media have internalized the process so thoroughly they do not even know they are conditioned creatures in a larger corporate/state machine. Put simply, Katie Couric and the dumbshits grinding out your local paper actually believe they are in the news business. In today's system, everybody is a patsy for the new corporate global order of things -- the well-coiffed talking head, the brain dead audience, even the terrorists themselves. All play out their parts in our holographic image and information process. ...

Through advertising and marketing, the hologram combs the fields of instinct and human desire, arranging our wants and fears in the direction of commodities or institutions. No longer are advertising and marketing merely propaganda, which is all but dead. Digitally mediated brain experience now works far below the crude propaganda zone of influence, deep in the swamps of the limbic brain, re-engineering and reshaping the realms of subjective human experience.

Yet we are the hologram, because we created it. In a relentlessly cycling feedback loop, we create and project the hologram out of our collective national psyche. The hologram in turn manages our collective psyche by regulating our terrors, cravings and neurological passions through the production of wars, whores, politics, profits and manna. Like legions of locusts, we pray before its productive engines of commerce and under the shifting aurora borealis of the hologram's drama and spectacle. It is us. We are it. The psychology of the individual becomes irrelevant as the swarm relentlessly devours the earth.

Today's Anti-Iran Info Op Update

The U.S. command in Baghdad is having a little trouble keeping it's message on target.

What can you expect when you have to simultaneously claim -- for two competing reasons -- that things are now getting better and that things are now getting worse.

As part of their "things are getting better" public affairs strategy, they have pointed to July's U.S. combat death toll as being the lowest in a year. You see, things have to be getting better by September so that Gen. Petraeus can come to Washington and paint an optimistic picture to secure the necessary funding to continue the war.

But at the same time, the administration has dictated that the military and OGA conduct an information operation against Iran, in preparation for an attack that may or may not be coming. Herein lies today's "enhanced" allegation against Iran.

Attacks on American-led forces using a lethal type of roadside bomb said to be supplied by Iran reached a new high in July, according to the American military.

The devices, known as explosively formed penetrators, were used to carry out 99 attacks last month and accounted for a third of the combat deaths suffered by the American-led forces, according to American military officials.

"July was an all-time high," Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, the No. 2 commander in Iraq, said in an interview, referring to strikes with such devices. ...

American intelligence says that its report of Iranian involvement is based on a technical analysis of exploded and captured devices, interrogations of Shiite militants, the interdiction of trucks near Iran's border with Iraq and parallels between the use of the weapons in Iran and in southern Lebanon by Hezbollah.

Some critics of Bush administration policy, saying there is no proof that the top echelons of Iran’s government are involved, accuse the White House of exaggerating the role of Iran and Syria to divert attention from its own mistakes.

According to American military data, penetrator attacks accounted for 18 percent of combat deaths of Americans and allied troops in Iraq in the last quarter of 2006. The number of such attacks declined in January, and some American officials thought at that time that this might be a response to their efforts to publicly highlight the allegations of an Iranian role.

But in recent months such attacks have risen steadily.

The July figure is roughly double the number for January. The total for July is also 50 percent higher than in April, when there were 65 penetrator attacks, according to American military officials.

The White House Carefully Chooses Their Words

As per recent habit -- administration critics of the NSA extra-legal warrantless spying program (CATCH-ALL) are missing the forest for the trees.

The truth of the matter is that the NSA warrantless spying program is so much bigger and all-encompassing than is generally known that the media and the public cannot get their minds around the idea.

This past weekend's legislation -- although it legalizes many overly intrusive measures and was passed due to the cowardice of the majority Democrats -- doesn't address the scope of the spying, which will continue to be conducted outside the legal constraints of FISA.

The White House maintained Monday that the surveillance measure signed into law by President Bush over the weekend did not give the government any sweeping new powers to eavesdrop on Americans without court warrants.

The chief concern of the White House centered on an assertion by Democrats, civil rights advocates and news organizations that the legislation in effect gave legal authorization to the National Security Agency's once-secret wiretapping program. [Apples and oranges - ed.] That program, approved by Mr. Bush soon after the Sept. 11 attacks, permitted the agency to eavesdrop without a court warrant on Americans' international e-mail messages and telephone calls, an operation that provoked intense debate about its legality.

The new measure, signed into law by the president on Sunday, allows intelligence officials to eavesdrop without a warrant on international phone calls or e-mail messages to or from an American inside the United States, but only if they conclude that the "target" is outside this country. The legislation gives broad discretion to the attorney general and the director of national intelligence, rather than a judge, in deciding how those complicated surveillance decisions are made.

Critics of the measure, which expires in six months, maintain that whether or not an American on United States soil is considered the "target" of an eavesdropping operation, the effect is the same: an end run around constitutional rights. But administration officials heatedly disputed that interpretation. ...

They said the legislation did not authorize "a driftnet" aimed at eavesdropping on large volumes of phone calls and e-mail messages inside the United States. But they declined to discuss in detail the N.S.A.'s broader efforts tracing and analyzing the patterns of American communications — who is calling and e-mailing whom — without actually listening to or reading the content of the conversations. Those broader data-mining activities were part of a heated dispute within the administration that led senior Justice Department officials in 2004 to refuse at first to certify the legality of the N.S.A. operations and to threaten to resign in protest over their continuation.

LMAO.

The "driftnet" most certainly is there. It is just not addressed in last weekend's legislation.

The first sift of the still secret part of the NSA program captures, inter alia all U.S. telephone and email traffic.

All of it.

That's why it is known as CATCH-ALL.

Suspected Leakers of CATCH-ALL Program Targeted

There are other -- much more outrageous than detailed in this article -- activities being conducted in the attempt to prevent some national security officials from disclosing what they know about this administration's illegalities in the conduct of the "war on terror."

Including Black Bag jobs.

The controversy over President Bush's warrantless surveillance program took another surprise turn last week when a team of FBI agents, armed with a classified search warrant, raided the suburban Washington home of a former Justice Department lawyer. The lawyer, Thomas M. Tamm, previously worked in Justice's Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR)—the supersecret unit that oversees surveillance of terrorist and espionage targets. The agents seized Tamm's desktop computer, two of his children's laptops and a cache of personal files. Tamm and his lawyer, Paul Kemp, declined any comment. So did the FBI. But two legal sources who asked not to be identified talking about an ongoing case told NEWSWEEK the raid was related to a Justice criminal probe into who leaked details of the warrantless eavesdropping program to the news media. The raid appears to be the first significant development in the probe since The New York Times reported in December 2005 that Bush had authorized the National Security Agency to eavesdrop on the international phone calls and e-mails of U.S. residents without court warrants. (At the time, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales said of the leak: "This is really hurting national security; this has really hurt our country.")

A veteran federal prosecutor who left DOJ last year, Tamm worked at OIPR during a critical period in 2004 when senior Justice officials first strongly objected to the surveillance program. Those protests led to a crisis that March when, according to recent Senate testimony, then A.G. John Ashcroft, FBI Director Robert Mueller and others threatened to resign, prompting Bush to scale the program back. Tamm, said one of the legal sources, had shared concerns about he program's legality, but it was unclear whether he actively participated in the internal DOJ protest.

Sleight-of-Hand Trick

Now we know why the White House has recently gotten its panties all in a bunch to get FISA changed.

A judge has ruled that an important part of the U.S. COMINT program is illegal.

But there is a deception story being floated by the administration involving this "revelation."

A federal intelligence court judge earlier this year secretly declared a key element of the Bush administration's wiretapping efforts illegal, according to a lawmaker and government sources, providing a previously unstated rationale for fevered efforts by congressional lawmakers this week to expand the president's spying powers.

House Minority Leader John A. Boehner (R-Ohio) disclosed elements of the court's decision in remarks Tuesday to Fox News as he was promoting the administration-backed wiretapping legislation. Boehner has denied revealing classified information, but two government officials privy to the details confirmed that his remarks concerned classified information.

The judge, whose name could not be learned, concluded early this year that the government had overstepped its authority in attempting to broadly surveil communications between two locations overseas that are passed through routing stations in the United States, according to two other government sources familiar with the decision. ...

The practical effect has been to block the NSA's efforts to collect information from a large volume of foreign calls and e-mails that passes through U.S. communications nodes clustered around New York and California. Both Democrats and Republicans have signaled they are eager to fix that problem through amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). ...

Gaining access to the foreign communications at issue would allow the NSA to tap into the huge volume of calls, faxes and e-mails that pass from one foreign country to another by way of fiber-optic connections in the United States.

"If you're calling from Germany to Japan or China, it's very possible that the call gets routed through the United States, despite the fact that there are geographically much more direct routes to Asia," said Stephan Beckert of Telegeography Inc. ...

Since March, the administration has quickly tried to build a case for the legislation, while concealing from the public and many in Congress a key event that appears to have driven the effort.

Do not be fooled by the administration about this. The spying being discussed here is not one of the important aspects of the extra-legal NSA domestic warrantless program that has brought the heat down upon the White House.

Intercepting "foreigner to foreigner while both outside the USA" communications has never required a FISA warrant and is not illegal.

The routing of so much of this traffic through the United States is not just an accident of technology. It is a marriage of convenience. The intelligence community assumed that it would be able to take advantage of their traditional legal ability to spy on foreigners and that building the modern telecom backbone in the USA and using it for international transit traffic would make their lives easier.

A judge obviously thought otherwise.

The politics of this "revelation" is important. The White House is already conflating this matter with the illegal NSA CATCH-ALL program that was exposed by the New York Times in December 2005. Sleight-of-hand always requires something in the decoy hand. Todays news is the decoy.

DOD Cannot Ensure That U.S.-Funded Equipment Has Reached Iraqi Security Forces

If we can't keep track of the weapons provided so far to the Iraqi army, I wonder how we are going to manage now that we are arming and equipping a new hodge-podge of Sunni tribesmen to fight against "Al Qaeda in Iraq."

From a new GAO report (25 page PDF):

Since 2003, the United States has provided about $19.2 billion to develop Iraqi security forces. DOD recently requested an additional $2 billion to continue this effort. Components of the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I), including the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), are responsible for implementing the U.S. program to train and equip Iraqi forces. ...

As of July 2007, DOD and MNF-I had not specified which DOD accountability procedures, if any, apply to the train-and-equip program for Iraq. Congress funded the train-and-equip program for Iraq outside traditional security assistance programs, which, according to DOD officials, allowed DOD a large degree of flexibility in managing the program. These officials stated that, since the funding did not go through traditional security assistance programs, the DOD accountability requirements normally applicable to these programs—including registering small arms transferred to foreign governments—did not apply. Further, MNF-I does not currently have an order or orders comprehensively specifying accountability procedures for equipment distributed to the Iraqi security forces.

DOD and MNF-I cannot fully account for Iraqi security forces’ receipt of U.S.-provided equipment. Two factors led to this lapse in accountability. First, MNSTC-I did not maintain a centralized record of all equipment distributed to the Iraqi security forces from June 2004 until December 2005. At that time, MNSTC-I established a consolidated property book system to track the issuance of equipment to the Iraqi security forces and attempted to recover past records. Our analysis found a discrepancy of at least 190,000 weapons between data reported by the former MNSTC-I commander and the property books. Former MNSTC-I officials stated that this lapse was due to an insufficient number of staff and the lack of a fully operational network to distribute equipment, among other reasons. Second, since the beginning of the program, MNSTC-I has not consistently collected supporting documents that confirm when the equipment was received, the quantities of equipment delivered, or the Iraqi units receiving the equipment. Since June 2006, the command has placed greater emphasis on collecting this documentation. However, our review of the 2007 property books found continuing problems with missing and incomplete records. Further, the property books consist of extensive electronic spreadsheets, which are an inefficient data management tool given the large amount of data and limited personnel available to maintain the system. MNSTC-I plans to move the property book records from a spreadsheet system to a database management system by summer 2007. ...

Although the former MNSTC-I commander reported that about 185,000 AK-47 rifles, 170,000 pistols, 215,000 items of body armor, and 140,000 helmets were issued to Iraqi security forces as of September 2005,18 the MNSTC-I property books contain records for only about 75,000 AK-47 rifles, 90,000 pistols, 80,000 items of body armor, and 25,000 helmets.19 Thus, DOD and MNF-I cannot fully account for about 110,000 AK-47 rifles, 80,000 pistols, 135,000 items of body armor, and 115,000 helmets reported as issued to Iraqi forces as of September 22, 2005. Our analysis of the MNSTC-I property book records found that DOD and MNF-I cannot fully account for at least 190,000 weapons reported as issued to Iraqi forces as of September 22, 2005.

CATCH-ALL Program Much Broader Than Known, FISA in Crosshairs

The media and the American people have no idea as to the shockingly inclusive nature of the data being captured by the NSA in the warrantless surveillance program.

For now, dribs and drabs about the spying are trickling out.

As T.S. Eliot wrote: "Mankind cannot bear too much reality."

The Bush administration's chief intelligence official said yesterday that President Bush authorized a series of secret surveillance activities under a single executive order in late 2001. The disclosure makes clear that a controversial National Security Agency program was part of a much broader operation than the president previously described.

The disclosure by Mike McConnell, the director of national intelligence, appears to be the first time that the administration has publicly acknowledged that Bush's order included undisclosed activities beyond the warrantless surveillance of e-mails and phone calls that Bush confirmed in December 2005.

In a letter to Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.), McConnell wrote that the executive order following the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks included "a number of . . . intelligence activities" and that a name routinely used by the administration -- the Terrorist Surveillance Program -- applied only to "one particular aspect of these activities, and nothing more."

The administration is now trying to gut FISA, the law that they have been breaking since 9/11. They are claiming that modern technology requires a change in the law.

The administration says that digital technology and the globalization of the telecommunications industry have created a legal quandary for the intelligence community. Some purely international telephone calls are now routed through telephone switches inside the United States, which means such "transit traffic" can be subject to federal surveillance laws requiring search warrants for any government eavesdropping.

Under the program of wiretapping without warrants, which began soon after the Sept. 11 attacks, the N.S.A. eavesdropped on the transit traffic without seeking court approval. But in January, the administration placed the program back under the FISA law, which meant warrants were required for surveillance of the transit traffic.

This is pretty extreme:

The Bush administration is pressing Congress this week for the authority to intercept, without a court order, any international phone call or e-mail between a surveillance target outside the United States and any person in the United States.

The proposal, submitted by Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell to congressional leaders on Friday, would amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) for the first time since 2006 so that a court order would no longer be needed before wiretapping anyone "reasonably believed to be located outside of the United States." ...

"They're hiding the ball here," said Caroline Fredrickson, director of the ACLU's Washington legislative office. "What the administration is really going after is the Americans. Even if the primary target is overseas, they want to be able to wiretap Americans without a warrant." ...

The proposal would also allow the NSA to "sit on the wire" and have access to the entire stream of communications without the phone company sorting, said Kate Martin, director of the Center for National Security Studies.

"It's a 'trust us' system," she said. "Give us access and trust us."

The administration's apologists who justify the serial violation of FISA by claiming that modern technology renders the written law obsolete are lying.

The FISA law is cut and dried. It says domestic spying requires a warrant. President Bush has admitted authorizing the NSA to spy on Americans in the United States without a warrant.

It is exactly the same as trying to argue your way out of a ticket for running a stop sign by claiming that the advanced technology that makes up your spiffy new car means that you no longer have to stop at that prominently placed red octagon that reads STOP.